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The construct of cognitive control is often invoked to provide a mechanism 
responsible for information-processing in ill-defined situations. However, the dual-
mechanism theory of cognitive control distinguishes between proactive and reactive 
varieties, and provides a more concrete framework for explaining behavior across various 
conditions. Importantly, although proactive and reactive cont rol have been theorized to 
apply to differential performance observed in various clinical and aging populations, no 
empirical work has been conducted examining how this theory may apply to individual 
differences in working memory capacity within a young, healthy population. The current 
research directly assessed proactive versus reactive control by administering three 
versions of the AX version of the continuous performance test to individuals varying in 
working memory capacity. Across the task versions, specific trial type frequencies were 
manipulated to examine whether this variable interacted with WMC to cause individuals 
to engage in one control type over the other. In addition, the current work investigated 
whether individuals can change their mode of control on a trial- to-trial basis, something 
that had not previously been examined. Individuals low in working memory capacity 
exhibited specific performance deficits relative to the individuals high in working 
memory capacity. The results extend the application of the dual-mechanism theory to 
individual differences in working memory capacity and provide a theoretical framework 







The notion of cognitive control has been invoked to explain performance in a 
number of activities. Broadly defined, cognitive control is the set of mental processes by 
which information is maintained in a temporary format to guide behavior in a manner 
consistent with fulfilling a goal or achieving task success. Cognitive control will be 
necessary to the extent that there are competing alternative actions that could be selected 
instead of the desired target behavior. The construct of cognitive control is conceptually 
similar or identical to several other terms used in the psychological literature, including 
executive attention, executive control, supervisory attention system, context-processing, 
selection-for-action, top-down processing, and goal maintenance. 
While many researchers agree that there must be a mechanism responsible for 
dealing with competing representations within the information-processing system, 
notions of cognitive control are unavoidably criticized as homuncular in nature. Can 
theories of human behavior account for the ability to deal with interference in a variety of 
situations and paradigms without yielding to the need to invoke a “ghost in the machine” 
(Ryle, 1949/1966) to explain performance? In addition, how can the seemingly disparate 
pattern of results throughout the executive control literature be explained in a 
parsimonious manner? Finally, can this account be implemented in such a way to explain 
variations in cognitive control that are observed within a certain age range and when 
comparing individuals of different ages? 
Braver, Gray, and Burgess (2007) have recently proposed a mechanistic account 
of cognitive control that aims to answer all three of these questions. Specifically, they 
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argue that their dual-mechanism theory of control provides a framework for 
understanding both person- and task-related variations in controlled behavior, based on 
knowledge of neurotransmitter and neuroanatomical properties of the human cortex. I 
begin by briefly reviewing existing theories of cognitive control before moving into a 
more detailed description of this new cognitive control model. 
Cognitive Control 
Various theories of cognitive control have guided the field of psychology since 
the cognitive revolution nearly 50 years ago. Some of the earliest theories focused on 
interpreting behavior as either automatic or controlled (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977). Subsequent theories couched control in terms of a high- level 
homunculus responsible for supervising and coordinating other lower cognitive 
components (Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Shallice, 1986). More recent models have 
focused on using knowledge of the anatomical and chemical substrates of cognitive 
control to constrain theories in biologically plausible ways (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001). Finally, other theories have focused on capturing variations in 
cognitive control reflected as differential performance with specific task characteristics 
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994), or as variations due to 
individual differences, aging, or psychopathology (Braver, Cohen, & Barch, 2002; Engle 
& Kane, 2004). 
In particular, the work of Engle and colleagues (Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane, 
Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007; Unsworth & Engle, 2007) is important to the notion 
of cognitive control used here. Engle and colleagues have provided evidence that 
performance on complex memory span tasks is predictive of behavior in a variety of 
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situations. In a typical complex span task, such as Operation Span (Unsworth, Heitz, 
Schrock, & Engle, 2005), participants must mentally solve math problems while also 
remembering letters for later recall. Variation in the ability to complete these types of 
tasks is taken to reflect individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC). Not 
only do individuals high in WMC outperform those low in WMC on a variety of memory 
tasks, but they also show improved performance on several attention and inhibition tasks 
(for review, see Engle & Kane, 2004). In fact, Engle and Kane interpreted individual 
differences in WMC as reflecting a more general executive control ability, whereby 
individuals high in WMC are better at maintaining goal-related information and also 
resolving response conflict in interference-rich situations. Thus, individuals differing in 
WMC are used in the current research as a crucible (Underwood, 1975) to explore the 
dual-mechanism theory of cognitive control proposed by Braver et al. (2007). 
Dual-Mechanism Theory of Control 
Building on these existing models, Braver et al. (2007) proposed a general theory 
of executive control to account for patterns of behavior observed in a variety of tasks 
within the cognitive literature. In addition, Braver and colleagues argued that their theory 
can potentially account for variations in behavior due to normal aging, psychopathology, 
and individual differences. One of the key aspects of this theory is the ability to account 
for the temporal dynamics of control in a biologically plausible way that is missing from 
most existing cognitive control theories. I begin by outlining the specific aspects of the 
theory, and then provide examples of applications of this framework that are relevant to 
the current research.  
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The dual-mechanism theory derives its name from the two modes of control that 
are assumed to be responsible for flexible behavior. The properties of each mode are 
given in Table 1. Proactive control involves the active maintenance of information that 
will help to respond appropriately to upcoming stimulus events. This information could 
be general task instructions, the identity of previous stimuli, or the relevant information 
conveyed by previous stimuli or cues that are salient for later behavior. The second mode 
of processing outlined by Braver and colleagues is reactive control. Reactive control 
involves the reactiva tion or retrieval of information that is imperative for the current 
decision-making; however, reactive control is only engaged in response to the probe or 
critical stimulus. 
Table 1 
Properties of Proactive and Reactive Control (Braver et al., 2007) 
 
 
Next, I describe the AX version of the continuous performance test (AX-CPT) in 
detail, because this specific task has been the predominant method used by Braver and 
colleagues to study proactive and reactive control. In addition, variations on this task 
form the basis of the current research. The AX-CPT is based on continuous performance 
tests that have been used in the literature to study cognitive processes associated with 
vigilance and stimulus detection (Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, & Beck, 1956). 
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In the typical version of the AX-CPT (see Figure 1), individual letters are presented one 
at a time and participants are required to make a target response when the letter X 












Figure 1. Example trial sequence from the AX-CPT. The numbers in parentheses indicate 
the total amount of time given to the participant to respond to each letter. 
 
These target sequences occur on the majority of trials (usually 70% of all letter 
sequences), so an expectancy to make a target response is created when the letter A is 
presented. However, on a small proportion of trials, the A will not be followed by an X 
(AY trial, where Y stands for all non-X letters), and the expectancy information will 
actually hurt performance. In addition, on a small proportion of trials the letter X will 
follow a letter other than A (BX trial, where B stands for all non-A letters). In this case, 
the participant should realize that because the letter was not an A, the following letter 
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does not require a target response. Because the letter X is so frequently responded to with 
a target response, the individual must maintain the biasing information from the 
preceding letter to avoid making an incorrect target response. Finally, letters other than A 
and X are presented sequentially (BY trial) to serve as a baseline condition; neither the 
first nor the second letter in this sequence signals a target response. The typical error and 
mean response time (RT) results from a large sample of healthy young adults are 
presented in Figures 2a and 2b as a point of reference. 
Braver and colleagues have used the AX-CPT to study proactive and reactive 
control according to the following logic. Individuals engaging in proactive control will 
sustain the information obtained from the cue to prepare either a target or nontarget 
response to the upcoming probe letter. Thus, proactive control will lead to fewer errors 
specifically on BX trials, but will also speed correct responses on AX, BX, and BY trials. 
However, AY trials should be more error-prone, and slower for correct trials, because the 
expected target stimulus does not occur. In contrast, individuals engaging in reactive 
control do not actively maintain the cue information during the cue-probe delay, and thus 
must rely upon a trans ient reactivation of the cue information when the probe appears. 
Therefore, reactive control will be demonstrated by more errors specifically on BX trials, 
and slower correct RTs on AX, BX, and possibly BY trials. However, on AY trials, not 
maintaining the A cue information should actually help performance, in that a target 
response has not been prepared. Thus, when a letter such as F appears as the probe, the 
participant can relatively quickly and accurately respond that it is not a target. As Braver 
et al. (2007) state, “In the AX-CPT, proactive control means control engaged by the cue, 


































Figure 2. Representative error rate (A) and correct mean RT (B) data from 175 young 
adults on the AX-CPT as presented in Braver et al. (2001). 
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The cued-Stroop (1935) task used by MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, and Carter 
(2000) also illustrates the proactive and reactive control distinction. In this task, a cue at 
the beginning of each trial informs the participant to either read the word or name the ink 
color in which the word is printed. Thus, the cue “word” or the cue “color” is important 
because in the subsequent incongruent stimulus (e.g., the word RED printed in green), the 
two dimensions provide evidence for different, conflicting responses. Note that the 
participant may not necessarily hold the representation “word” during the delay between 
the cue and the stimulus, but instead may translate this cue into a task goal such as “read 
the word”. Importantly, the signature of proactive control is the use of information to 
prepare the system to respond before the imperative stimulus occurs. In this example 
given above, reactive control would manifest as attempting to remember which cue had 
just been presented only after seeing the incongruent stimulus. Note that reactive control 
may be as likely to lead to trial success as proactive control, but there are situations 
where one or the other form of control may be best-suited for achieving task goals. For 
example, if the word RED was presented in red ink as occurs on congruent trials, 
presumably either proactive or reactive control would lead to the correct response of 
“red”. However, if the participant was to make an overt response before a fast response 
deadline, the reactive control mode may be too slow to produce an accurate response in 
the time necessary.  
Manipulations that Affect the Usage of Proactive and Reactive Control 
In addition, the overall task context may encourage one form of control over 
another. Stroop tasks that use only the color-naming condition produce varying degrees 
of interference according to the proportion of incongruent trials within an experimental 
 9
block (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 
1992). Stroop interference is commonly measured by comparing the performance on 
incongruent versus neutral or congruent trials, with typically slower RTs on incongruent 
trials. The standard observation is that as the relative frequency of incongruent trials 
increases, the Stroop RT interference effect decreases. When incongruent trials rarely 
occur, performance on these trials is typically much slower than blocks in which 
incongruent trials are high-frequency events. In addition, more errors tend to be made on 
incongruent trials within mostly-congruent Stroop blocks. Braver and Hoyer (2008) 
recently argued that these proportion congruency effects reflect the overall task context 
influencing either a proactive or reactive mode of control. Specifically, the increase in RT 
and errors on incongruent trials within mostly-congruent Stroop blocks reflects a reactive 
mode, as the majority of trials can be successfully responded to by reading the word or 
naming the ink color. It is only on the infrequent incongruent trials that the cost of not 
sustaining the task goal of color naming is observed. In contrast, Braver and Hoyer 
argued that performance on incongruent trials within mostly- incongruent blocks reflects 
the proactive mode of control. Because word-reading is a faster process than color-
naming for most literate individuals (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994), optimal performance is 
more easily achieved by establishing the task set before the stimulus appears onscreen.  
In support of these arguments, Braver and Hoyer (2008) found that the Stroop RT 
interference effect and the percentage of incongruent errors were indeed greater in the 
mostly-congruent block compared to the mostly- incongruent block, replicating earlier 
work. Previous Stroop studies with older adults (West & Baylis, 1998) and low-WMC 
young adults (Daniels, 2003; Kane & Engle, 2003) indicate that these two groups are 
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particularly affected by proportion congruency effects, by making substantially more 
incongruent errors when these trial types are particularly rare (Table 2). However, the 
older adults’ and low-WMC individuals’ performance on mostly- incongruent blocks was 
not consistent with strictly a proactive mode of control, given that the RT interference 
effect and number of errors on incongruent trials were still substantial. Thus, 
manipulations of overall task context can push participants to use a proactive or reactive 
mode of control, although some populations appear less likely to use proactive control 
even when the situational constraints call for it. 
Table 2 
Comparison of Stroop RT Facilitation and Interference Effects and Incongruent Errors 
as a Function of Proportion Congruency 
 
  Mostly Congruent    Mostly Incongruent 
 Facil RT Interf RT Inc Err  Facil RT Interf RT Inc Err 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Braver & Hoyer (2008) 
 
Young 84 ms  90 ms  7%  14 ms  40 ms  2% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
West & Baylis (1998) 
 
Young 100 ms 164 ms 4%  6 ms  41 ms  4% 





High 19 ms  78 ms  8%  -8 ms  43 ms  3%  
Low 33 ms  114 ms 18%  14 ms  75 ms  7% 
Note. Facil: Facilitation; Interf: Interference; RT: Response Time; Inc Err: Incongruent 
Errors. 
 
Locke and Braver (2008) also manipulated overall task context by having 
participants perform a standard version of the AX-CPT first, and then perform the task 
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again with an incentive for speeded performance. The participants were told that they 
would be additionally compensated by 25 cents for each trial that they responded to faster 
than their median RT in the standard version. By encouraging participants to make faster 
responses, Locke and Braver argued they also increased the likelihood of the participants 
using a proactive strategy. By preparing to respond before the critical probe stimulus 
appeared, the RTs should be faster when compared to a reactive control mode that begins 
the response process after the probe letter occurs. They found that participants were faster 
on all trial types in the incentive compared to the standard version. Critically, they only 
observed an increase in error rate on AY nontarget trials. This is consistent with the idea 
that participants were engaged in a proactive control mode, as increased AY errors reflect 
preparing a target response based on the A cue, and here maintaining the cue information 
actually impairs performance. In addition, because the B cue perfectly predicts a 
nontarget response to the upcoming probe, translating this information into a preparation 
for a nontarget response decreases RTs without an increase in errors. Again, the 
manipulation of overall task context shifted the participants’ into a proactive control 
mode (see Meyer & Kieras, 1997, for similar arguments regarding daring versus cautious 
strategies). 
These are but a few of the examples of the research that has been conducted 
examining the dual-mechanism theory of control (see Braver et al., 2007, for other work). 
As seen in the examples above, when a premium is placed on responding quickly, 
proactive control is important for sustaining pre-target information to bias future 
responding in a way consistent with expectancies and the schedule of rewards and 
punishments. However, there may be instances where there is either no predictive 
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information available to help prepare one action versus another, or the cue or warning 
information that is available for use is unreliable. Another variable that will affect the use 
of proactive or reactive control is the amount of time expected before the critical behavior 
will have to be performed. If the imperative event is merely seconds away, proactive 
control may be the logical mode to use. However, if the event is expected to occur 12 
hours in the future, engaging in proactive control over this interval will be resource-
demanding from both an attentional and a metabolic standpoint. Finally, there might be 
some populations that are either unable or unlikely to engage in proactive control, even 
when success depends upon using this mode of control.  
A more familiar example may help solidify the main properties of the proactive 
versus reactive control distinction. Imagine that you are driving your vehicle at a high 
speed when you notice that a car appears ready to pull out from a side street into your 
lane of traffic. In order to avoid an accident, you could engage in proactive control by 
preparing to swerve into the other lane if the car does in fact turn in front of you. It is 
possible that you could mentally note that the car is about to pull out without actually 
translating that to an avoidant maneuver. Even if you have not prepared to swerve in 
advance, it may still be possible to use reactive control to switch lanes at the last second. 
However, it is likely that there is more of a chance of an accident in this latter case, as 
you would need to react very quickly to avoid hitting the turning car. Other variables may 
influence the likelihood of engaging in proactive or reactive control in this situation. For 
example, if you are driving a motorcycle, the consequences for not using predictive 
information from the driving environment could be more hazardous. In addition, you may 
have driven on this stretch of road previously and had an accident or near-accident in a 
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similar situation. Accessing this previous event history may bias you to engage in 
proactive control mode to ensure that an error (an accident) does not occur. 
Neural Mechanisms of Proactive and Reactive Control 
Another property that distinguishes between proactive and reactive control is not 
only whether neural activity is sustained or transient, but also which brain regions and 
neurotransmitter systems are responsible for these dissociable control modes (Table 1). 
Braver et al. (2007) argued that a network of frontal and medial temporal regions is 
responsible for implementing cognitive control. Specifically, lateral prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) is the region that maintains cue-related contextual information during the delay 
period between the cue and probe. In contrast, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) may 
signal the need for control when a conflicting stimulus is encountered, especially if the 
cue information was not maintained in an active state (e.g., an X following a B in the 
AX-CPT). In these situations, the medial temporal lobe and hippocampal areas may 
initiate a retrieval process to locate within memory the identity of the last-presented cue 
letter. Interestingly, the lateral PFC should also show increased activity when reactive 
control is used, but only transiently after the probe stimulus has been presented. 
Evidence for these areas working in concert to determine performance comes 
from several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. In the cued-Stroop 
study described earlier (MacDonald et al., 2000), increased activity during the cue-probe 
delay was observed within left lateral PFC when the upcoming word stimulus required a 
color-naming decision and not the stronger word-reading response. However, ACC 
activity was increased in response to the presentation of an incongruent word stimulus. 
Consistent with the idea that these areas are part of a control network, the level of cue-
 14
related activity in lateral PFC observed before the stimulus was highly correlated with the 
level of probe-related activity in ACC after the stimulus was presented. Other examples 
of this relationship between lateral PFC activity and ACC activity have also been 
observed in the flankers task (Kerns et al., 2004) and the AX-CPT (Botvinick, Nystrom, 
Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999). 
Braver and Hoyer (2008) also compared neural activity across the manipulations 
of proportion congruency within the Stroop task described earlier. In the mostly-
incongruent condition, which was argued to reflect proactive control, right lateral PFC 
was observed to display sustained increased activity throughout the run, regardless of 
trial type. In contrast, performance consistent with a reactive mode of control was 
observed within bilateral ACC and lateral PFC regions, among others. In the mostly-
congruent condition, no sustained activity was observed, but instead these areas showed 
transient increased activity specifically in response to incongruent stimuli. Other studies 
examining the effect of Stroop proportion congruency manipulations have produced the 
same pattern of results implicating the PFC and ACC (Carter et al., 2000; Leung, 
Skudlarski, Gatenby, Peterson, & Gore, 2000). 
Neuroimaging studies using the AX-CPT have also isolated the dorsolateral PFC 
as being specifically activated in healthy young adults (Barch et al., 1997; Barch et al., 
2001; Holmes et al., 2005; MacDonald & Carter, 2003; Perlstein, Dixit, Carter, Noll, & 
Cohen, 2003). In addition, event-related fMRI studies identified dorsolateral PFC and 
ACC as showing increased activity specifically on BX and BY trials (MacDonald & 
Carter, 2003; MacDonald et al., 2005; Perlstein et al., 2003). These findings indicate that 
the dorsolateral PFC and ACC are important in holding cue information in active 
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memory, consistent with a series of rat lesion studies (for review, see Haddon & Kilcross, 
2007) in the animal literature. Finally, electrophysiological studies have identified a 
frontocentrally-based positive waveform that has a larger amplitude during the cue-probe 
delay in response to B cues compared to A cues (Dias, Foxe, & Javitt, 2003; Javitt, 
Shelley, Silipo, & Lieberman, 2000). These results identify the lateral PFC and ACC as 
being critically involved in the implementation of proactive control.  
In addition to specific brain regions, Braver et al. (2007) have proposed that 
different aspects of the dopaminergic system are responsible for proactive vs. reactive 
control. Based on research showing that there are both phasic and tonic changes in the 
level of dopamine present in the frontal-midbrain loop (Grace, 1991), Braver et al. (2007) 
argued that dopamine serves as a gating function to the PFC neurons. Specifically, phasic 
dopamine activity is argued to be important in updating processes, while tonic dopamine 
activity is responsible for maintenance. Braver et al. (2007) argued that the phasic 
changes in dopamine level in response to the presentation of a cue or other predictive 
information only occur if the individual is using proactive control. Therefore, although 
the dopaminergic system within the PFC and midbrain is largely responsible for these 
updating and maintenance processes, different modes of control will alter dopamine’s 
effect upon the network of cognitive control areas. 
Similarity to Other Theories 
 Although the dual-mechanism theory is unique in its ability to instantiate 
cognitive control according to differences in the temporal dynamics and location of 
neural activity, there are similarities to other existing models of control. Most notably, 
Jacoby, Kelley, and McElree (1999) proposed a memory model that distinguished 
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between early-selection and late-correction cognitive control processes. Similar to the 
dual-mechanism theory, Jacoby et al. argue that early-selection is used to override 
automatic processing that may lead to errors, although late-correction may lead to task 
success in certain conditions. Likewise, the model recently proposed by Unsworth and 
Engle (2007) includes a flexible primary memory buffer to protect information from 
interference, and a secondary memory component whereby a controlled search process is 
used to locate the appropriate memory traces or stimulus-response mappings among other 
memory representations. Each theory uses two functions to account for behavior in 
interference-rich situations, and each has attempted to account for variations in control 
exhibited by either aging (Jacoby et al., 1999) or individual differences in WMC 
(Unsworth & Engle, 2007). 
Age Differences as Variation in Proactive and Reactive Control 
Braver, Satpute, Rush, Racine, and Barch (2005) initially proposed the proactive 
and reactive control distinctions based on the pattern of errors and correct RTs exhibited 
by healthy older adults on the AX-CPT (Table 3), and so I will briefly review the 
evidence for this idea. In Braver et al. (2001), older adults did not produce statistically 
more errors across the various trial types compared to young adults, in contrast to 
previous research with schizophrenia patients. However, the pattern of RTs for the two 
age groups revealed interesting differences on AY and BX trials. Specifically, the older 
adults were numerically faster than young adults on AY trials, whereas older adults 
displayed proportionally greater slowing than young adults on BX trials. This pattern of 
equivalent error rates and slowed BX RTs has been generally replicated in subsequent 
aging studies (Braver et al., 2005; Paxton, Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2008; Paxton, Barch, 
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Storandt, & Braver, 2006), although young adults have been shown to produce more 
errors than the older adults on AY trials in a couple of the latter studies. If young adults 
are more likely to use proactive control than older adults, than they would be expected to 
make more AY false alarms than older adults. If older adults are more likely to use 
reactive control than younger adults, they should be slower to respond on AX and even 
BY trials, because they are not preparing a response before the probe appears. However, 
this would specifically impair older adults’ speed to respond on BX tria ls, where the 
probe information is strongly associated with a target response, and the cue identity must 
be reactivated in order to respond correctly. Examining Table 3, the age difference (older 
minus young) in BX RTs was +150, + 195, +251, and +75 ms across the four studies. In 
comparison, the age difference in AY RTs was -10, +50, +140, and +79 ms across the 
four studies. Note the larger age RT differences were found on BX trials, even though 
young adults responded to these quicker than AY trials. This is inconsistent with much of 
the aging literature indicating that older adults’ RTs can be predicted as a constant 
multiplier of young adults’ observed RTs in various conditions (e.g., Brinley, 1965). 
However, this pattern is consistent with the argument that older adults use a reactive 
control mode, and young adults more often use a proactive control mode in performing 
the AX-CPT. 
In a similar vein, Mayr (2001) argued that older adults have difficulty using a 
preparatory cue to make the appropriate response during a cued task-switching paradigm. 
He found that older adults were slowed specifically when the stimulus was ambiguous as 
to the correct response, and proposed that older adults were not using the cue-stimulus 
interval to engage the appropriate mental set during the delay period. Instead, older adults  
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Table 3 
Young vs. Older Adults’ and High- vs. Low-WMC Groups’ Performance on AX-CPT 
 
   Errors     Correct RTs 
  AX AY BX BY  AX AY BX BY 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Braver et al. (2001) 
 
Young  3.5% 6.0% 4.0% 0.5%  435 605 485 430 
Older  5.0% 5.0% 5.8% 0.0%  475 595 635 505 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Braver et al. (2005) 
 
Young  4.0% 13.0% 6.0% 1.0%  390 555 375 370 
Older  4.5%   4.8% 3.6% 0.5%  490 605 570 490 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Paxton et al. (2006) 
 
Young  2.0% 11.0% 4.0% 0.0%  405 560 423 381 
Older  1.0%   2.0% 3.0% 0.0%  554 700 674 523 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Paxton et al. (2008) 
 
Young  2.0% 2.0% 6.0% 1.0%  552 696 530 547 
Older  0.0% 4.0% 7.0% 1.0%  592 775 605 610 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Redick and Engle (2008) 
 
High  3.3% 21.7%   2.0% 1.2%  393 580 326 331 
Low  7.1% 22.5% 14.1% 1.8%  442 598 395 426 
Note. Only long cue-probe delay data presented; Target/nontarget decision for each letter. 
 
may have been attempting to retrieve the current task and corresponding stimulus-
response pairings after the critical stimulus was presented. Despite the differences in the 
processes assumed to account for aging performance on the AX-CPT and in the task-
switching literature, conceptualizing the older adults as engaging in reactive control 
provides a parsimonious account for the data in both cases. 
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In addition, there is evidence suggesting that older adults have impairments in 
PFC functioning (e.g., West, 1996), along with concomitant declines in cognitive abilities 
that are related to decreases in dopaminergic functioning (Volkow et al., 1998). Indeed, 
Braver et al. (2005) speculated that the phasic dopamine bursts that serve as the PFC 
gating signal to implement updating may be more sensitive to aging than tonic dopamine 
activity, which would lead older adults to be more likely to engage in reactive control. 
Important for the study proposed here, Bopp and Verhaeghen (2005) have shown that 
older adults show specific declines on WMC measures as compared to other memory 
span tasks. More direct support indicating that young and older adults differ in 
performing the AX-CPT comes from a neuroimaging study conducted by Paxton et al. 
(2008). In this study, the authors selectively isolated regions that met certain criteria to 
reflect reactive control within the older adults. Given previous research that demonstrated 
that young adults exhibit more cue-related activity to B cues compared to A cues 
(MacDonald & Carter, 2003; MacDonald et al., 2005; Perlstein et al., 2003), Paxton et al. 
(2008) identified right dorsolateral PFC as the only region showing increased activity 
during the cue-probe delay in the young adults relative to older adults. This result 
suggests older adults were not actively maintaining the cue information during the delay 
period. In addition, the dual-mechanism theory predicts that individuals engaging in 
reactive control will show increased probe-related activity when the cue information must 
be reactivated to make the appropriate response (viz., BX trials). Therefore, Paxton et al. 
identified the right dorsolateral PFC and right middle frontal gyrus as areas that showed 
increase probe-related activity in older adults compared to young adults. Thus, by 
separating neural activity during different parts of each trial, Paxton et al. provided strong 
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evidence that older adults were engaging in reactive control, as exhibited both by their 
behavioral performance and by the different temporal dynamics of their activation.  
Individual Differences in WMC as Variation in Proactive and Reactive Control 
Although the dual-mechanism theory can account for the aging data observed in 
the AX-CPT and other tasks, Braver et al. (2007) also proposed that the proactive versus 
reactive distinction might be able to account for individual differences in behavior as 
well. Although they have primarily focused on personality variables (e.g., Locke and 
Braver, 2008), Braver et al. (2007) speculated that “individuals with high-WM span and 
high gF should thus show an increased tendency to use proactive control strategies, but 
only in the task demands that most require and benefit from such strategies” (p. 89). That 
is, although young adults are expected to use proactive control more often than older 
adults, variation in WMC may explain variation in cognitive control observed within 
young adults. For example, low-WMC individuals exhibit a pattern of Stroop 
performance consistent with reactive control. In addition to the WMC results discussed 
previously and given in Table 2, Kane and Engle (2003) found that low-WMC 
individuals were more likely to read the word during the Stroop task. In Experiment 4, 
Kane and Engle (2003) examined error latencies, with the expectation that fast errors on 
incongruent trials largely represent forgetting the goal of naming the ink color in favor of 
reading the word. They found that the error latencies for incongruent trials were 
equivalent to correct congruent trials, and not statistically different between WMC 
groups. The main observation was that low-WMC individuals produced dramatically 
more of these types of errors than the high-WMC individuals. Thus, WMC group was 
diagnostic of the frequency of engaging in reactive control.  
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Redick and Engle (2008) administered a version of the AX-CPT that intermixed 
short (1000 ms) and long (5000 ms) intervals between the cue and probe letters. The 
results for the long-delay condition are presented in Table 3. The low-WMC group made 
more errors on AX and BX trials, but did not differ on AY or BY error rates. This finding 
is consistent with most of the schizophrenia patient literature with the AX-CPT, and 
suggests that low-WMC individuals were hurt by not maintaining the cue information to 
respond appropriately to X probes. Although the low-WMC group was slower overall, 
they were not statistically slower than the high-WMC group on AY trials. Consistent with 
the aging data described earlier, the WMC group (low minus high) difference in BX RTs 
was +65 ms, whereas the difference on AY RTs was +18 ms. 
Although the overall pattern of errors and correct RTs across trial types is 
consistent with the notion that high-WMC individuals are engaged in proactive control, 
and low-WMC individuals are less likely to use proactive control, further analyses help to 
support this interpretation. First, we examined the difference in performance on AY and 
BX trials for each WMC group. If AY errors are due to preparing a target response, and 
BX errors are due to not maintaining the cue information, then the group with the larger 
error difference (AY minus BX) is more proactive. In addition, if AY RTs are slower 
because an individual has to overcome the prepared and expected target response, and 
BX RTs are faster due to preparing a nontarget response based on the B cue information, 
then the group with the larger RT difference (AY minus BX) is more proactive. In both 
cases, the high-WMC groups had a statistically greater AY-BX difference score, 
indicating that as a group, high-WMC individuals were more likely to use proactive 
control. In addition, although performance on the AY and BX trials are typically the 
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focus of Braver and colleagues, valuable information can be gained from examining the 
time to respond to AX targets that occur on 70% of the trials. If an individual is actively 
maintaining the cue and preparing a target response during the cue-probe delay, that 
individual would be expected to both be faster and more consistent in their RT to the X 
when it appears. By calculating each participant’s individual standard deviation for AX 
trials, we found that the low-WMC group showed more variability when correctly 
responding to targets, compared to the high-WMC group. Again, this evidence suggests 
that, as Braver et al. (2007) predicted, high-WMC individuals are using proactive control 
more often than low-WMC individuals. 
Another recent study is also indicative of a relationship between WMC and 
proactive control. Redick, Calvo, Gay, and Engle (2009) compared high- and low-WMC 
groups on two versions of a go/no-go task. In the standard version of the task, 
participants were instructed to make a simple button press to any letter except X (go). On 
20% of the trials, the letter X occurred, and participants were instructed to withhold 
responses (no-go). In this version, there were no WMC group differences in accuracy or 
RTs. Previous research on a similar go/no-go task failed to find age differences as well 
(Rush, Barch, & Braver, 2006). In the second version of the task, which we have labeled 
a conditional go/no-go task, participants were instructed to respond only to the letter M or 
the letter W and withhold responding to any other letters. However, there was an 
additional rule such that the letters M or W had to alternate from the last presentation in 
order to be a go trial. For example, a participant might see the following five letters on 
consecutive trials: F…M…W…J…W. In this example, the first instance of M and W 
would be go trials, but the second instance of W would be classified as a no-go trial 
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because it had not alternated since the last presentation of either an M or W. As opposed 
to the standard go/no-go version that used a consistent rule for responding, the 
conditional go/no-go version required using the previous go stimulus in order to respond 
correctly when the next M or W was presented. The no-go trials here are similar to BX 
trials in the AX-CPT – if the participant has not maintained previous stimulus (cue) 
information, then it will be difficult to not respond to the X (M or W) as a target. 
In contrast to the standard version, WMC group differences were observed on the 
conditional go/no-go task. A WMC by trial type interaction revealed that the low-WMC 
group made slightly more omission errors than the high-WMC group on go trials, and 
many more commission errors than the high-WMC group on no-go trials. In addition, 
when they correctly responded on go trials, the low-WMC group was more variable but 
not slower than the high-WMC group. These results corroborate the AX-CPT results, in 
that the low-WMC individuals appeared less likely to actively maintain the previous go 
stimulus information, consistent with the idea that they were less likely to be using 
proactive control. 
Finally, results from the antisaccade task provide additional information about the 
ways that high- and low-WMC individuals use cues to guide behavior in demanding 
situations (Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004). In Experiment 1, high- and low-WMC 
participants were presented with prosaccade and antisaccade blocks of trials in which the 
task instruction was to either look toward or away from the box that flashed on the left or 
right side of the screen. Because participants can quickly respond on prosaccade trials in 
a reflexive manner, reactive control should have been the mode employed by both WMC 
groups. In line with this idea, there were no WMC differences in errors or correct 
 24
latencies during the prosaccade blocks. However, and consistent with previous research 
(Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001), low-WMC individuals were slower and made 
more errors during the antisaccade block of trials. The antisaccade block of trials requires 
proactive control, in order to keep the task goal or response rule (e.g., look away from the 
flashing stimulus) active to guide behavior and prevent the reflexive but incorrect 
response of looking toward the flashing box. The data suggest that the low-WMC 
individuals were more frequently engaging in reactive control instead, as evidenced by 
the reflexive errors and slower responses even when correct. 
In Experiment 2, Unsworth et al. (2004) changed to a cued-saccade version of the 
task. Here, a cue 1200 ms before the critical stimulus indicated whether each trial 
required a pro- or antisaccade as the correct response. Given this manipulation, one might 
expect that the participants can use the cue to prepare a general response rule for the 
upcoming stimulus (look toward stimulus / look away from stimulus), but preparation of a 
specific response is not possible until the actual stimulus is presented. In this way, the 
cued-saccade task is similar to the cued-Stroop task and cued-task-switching paradigm 
described earlier, and different from the AX-CPT task in which a specific target or 
nontarget response can be prepared based on the cue. Critically, not maintaining the cue 
information in an active state during the cue-stimulus interval will result in slower 
performance on more errors for both types of trials in the cued-saccade task. That is, in 
the cued-Stroop task, if the word RED is presented in red ink, then accurate performance 
can be achieved even if the task cue to name the ink or read the word was not maintained. 
However, in the cued-saccade task, the correct response is dependent upon remembering 
the task cue (except for guessing). Importantly, Unsworth et al. (2004) found that the 
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low-WMC group was slower and more error-prone than the high-WMC group on both 
prosaccade and antisaccade trials. Note that this finding is somewhat at odds with the 
executive attention framework (Kane et al., 2007), as that theory would not necessarily 
predict that low-WMC individuals would go against the prepotent response and produce 
prosaccade errors. However, if the low-WMC individuals are construed as engaging in 
reactive control, and the high-WMC individuals as using proactive control, then the 
pattern of results is consistent. The low-WMC group was less likely to use the task cue to 
ready the information-processing system prior to the onset of the target stimulus, and thus 
attempted to retrieve the cue information and stimulus-response mappings after the 
stimulus appeared. This search process is more vulnerable to proactive interference from 
previous trials (Unsworth & Engle, 2007), and thus low-WMC individuals would make 
errors on both prosaccade and antisaccade trials. In addition, the fact that the high-WMC 
group was also faster to correctly respond on both types of trials is consistent with the 
idea that they were using proactive control. 
There have been a number of recent investigations into the neural mechanisms 
responsible for individual differences in WMC that are relevant to the dual-mechanism 
theory. Kane and Engle’s (2002) review of the neuroscience literature suggests that low-
WMC individuals have impaired dorsolateral PFC functioning. Osaka, Kondo, and 
colleagues (Kondo et al., 2004; Kondo, Osaka, & Osaka, 2004; Osaka et al., 2003; Osaka 
et al., 2004) have demonstrated across several fMRI studies that PFC and ACC activity, 
and the connectivity between these regions, are critical in accounting for neural 
differences between high- and low-WMC individuals while performing measures of 
WMC. Several other theories of working memory indicate an important role for 
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dorsolateral PFC (Chein, Fiez, & Ravizza, 2002; D’Esposito, Postle, Ballard, & Lease, 
1998). In addition, recent research has demonstrated that individuals low in WMC have 
lower levels of dopamine present in the striatum compared to high-WMC individuals 
(Cools, Gibbs, Miyakawa, Jagust, & D’Esposito, 2008). Similar to the neural evidence in 
older adults, the profile of low-WMC individuals is consistent with what Braver et al. 
(2007) predict for a reactive control mode. 
Current Research 
Despite the evidence just reviewed, there are still several unanswered questions in 
regard to specific applications and tests of the dual-mechanism theory of cognitive 
control. The current research was designed to answer some of these unresolved questions, 
as well as provide tests of new predictions of this model. For example, the evidence 
reviewed thus far suggests that in healthy young adults, proactive control best accounts 
for the pattern of behavioral data and neural activity during performance of the AX-CPT 
and other tasks. However, the research just reviewed indicates that there are individual 
differences in the use of proactive and reactive control within young adults. Thus, the 
current study examined high- and low-WMC young adults in a series of tests of the dual-
mechanism theory. Although the evidence suggests that low-WMC young adults are less 
likely to use proactive control than high-WMC young adults, perhaps this ability is intact 
in these participants and they instead choose not to use proactive control. I have 
discussed proactive and reactive control as being an either/or distinction that describes 
the behavior of an individual, but Braver et al. (2007) speculated that “it may be the case 
that the two systems are fully independent, and thus may be engaged in both 
simultaneously” (p. 85). If this is true, it may be possible for high-WMC individuals to 
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engage in both a proactive and reactive control mode better than low-WMC individuals, 
depending on the situation. This might explain the discrepancy between AY and BX 
errors observed in Redick and Engle (2008). Although the high-WMC individuals’ high 
AY error rate and low BX error rate is consistent with proactive control alone, the low-
WMC individuals produced high rates of AY and BX errors. This suggests a combined 
proactive and reactive control style across various trials. Thus, a more complete 
evaluation of proactive and reactive control will allow these ideas to be fully examined. 
The AX-CPT was used to investigate these issues related to proactive and reactive 
control, for the following reasons. One reason is to maintain consistency with the existing 
literature and replicate our previous work. The second reason is that the AX-CPT 
provides a way to systematically manipulate target frequency, which should produce 
different results within the proactive versus reactive control framework. Finally, the cue 
information in the AX-CPT allows biasing of distinct responses to the various probes 
across the different trial types, and provides a way to measure proactive and reactive 
control more specifically. In contrast, the Stroop task has provided evidence for the dual-
mechanism theory of control, but it is difficult to identify the mode of control being used. 
If given a cue to name the color of the ink, or presented with a block of mostly 
incongruent trials that should encourage proactive control, it is not possible for the 
participant to selectively prepare one response (e.g., red, green, etc.) over another. At 
best, the participant can sustain the goal information and perhaps activate all possible 
responses. 
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Target Frequency Manipulations 
This last point is particularly important for the three versions of the AX-CPT used 
in the current study. The first version is similar to the AX-CPT I have discussed 
throughout, and is labeled AX-CPT-70. As can be seen in Table 4, “70” refers to the 
percentage of trials in that version of the AX-CPT that are the AX targets. Accordingly, 
in this version 70% of the trials are AX targets, and the other three nontarget trial types 
occur 10% each. Thus, this version connects to the existing AX-CPT literature on 
psychopathology and aging by investigating individual differences in WMC and serving 
to replicate Redick and Engle (2008). As has been discussed throughout, data obtained 
via computational simulations and empirical studies indicate that optimal performance on 
the AX-CPT-70 is produced via a proactive strategy (Braver et al., 2007). Cue 
information guides the appropriate responding to probes, and maintaining this context 
over the cue-probe delay will aid participants in responding quickly and accurately on all 
trial types except for the rare occasion when a Y probe follows an A. Overall, this version 
of the AX-CPT-70 induces a global context of proactive control (Table 5). 
Another version used in the current study is the AX-CPT-10 (Table 4). This 
version switches the frequencies for AX and AY trials, such that now AX targets occur 
on 10% of trials, whereas AY nontargets occur on 70% of all trials. BX and BY trials 
remain at 10% each of all trials. Participants are still expected to engage in a proactive 
strategy in the AX-CPT-10, with the exception that the information from the A cue in this 
version should lead the participant engaging in proactive control to prepare a nontarget 
response, given that AY trials are 70% of all trials. In this way, the AX targets occur 
much less frequently than the AX-CPT-70 just discussed, but the information gained 
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from the cues in these two versions is equivalent. Again, the global context of the AX-
CPT-10 should lead to use of proactive control (Table 5). 
Table 4 
Stimulus Probabilities for the Different Versions of the AX-CPT 
 






AX 70 .8 .8   .875  .875  .875 
AY 10 .8 .2   .125  .875  .000 
BX 10 .2 .8   .500  .000  .875 






AX 10 .8 .2   .125  .125  .500 
AY 70 .8 .8   .875  .125  .000 
BX 10 .2 .2   .500  .000  .500 






AX 40 .8 .5   .500  .500  .800 
AY 40 .8 .5   .500  .500  .000 
BX 10 .2 .5   .500  .000  .800 
BY 10 .2 .5   .500  .000  .000 
Note. Freq: Frequency; targ: target. 
 
Finally, the AX-CPT-40 was used to assess unanswered questions of the dual-
mechanism theory. In this version, both AX targets and AY nontargets each occur on 
40% of trials, with BX and BY nontargets still occurring on 10% of all trials (Table 4). 
The advantage of the AX-CPT-40 is that the A cues here carry different predictive 
validity compared to the previous two versions of the AX-CPT. Here, A cues predict a  
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Table 5 
Predictions of Optimal Proactive versus Reactive Control Usage for Each Version of the 
AX-CPT 
 







AX   70    proactive (T)  
AY   10    proactive (T)  
BX   10    proactive (NT)  






AX   10    proactive (NT) 
AY   70    proactive (NT) 
BX   10    proactive (NT)  






AX   40    reactive  
AY   40    reactive  
BX   10    proactive (NT)  
BY   10    proactive (NT)  
Note. T: Target; NT: Nontarget. 
 
target or nontarget response with equal probability. Contrast this with A cues from the 
previous versions, which served as mostly valid cues, and with B cues in each version, 
which are 100% predictive of a nontarget response. In this version, there is no consistent 
control strategy that should be employed to produce optimal performance, and although 
the frequency of A cues here is the same as in the previous two versions that led to 
proactive control, now reactive control is expected to be engaged in response to A cues. 
 31
This condition critically assesses a speculative idea raised by Braver and Hoyer (2008), 
namely that participants may alternate “on a trial-by-trial basis between a proactive 
control state and a reactive control state”. In the AX-CPT-40, the cue-probe 
contingencies are set up to study within the same task whether or not cognitive control 
can dynamically shift between the optimal control states, and whether or not this ability 
differs for high- and low-WMC individuals. 
WMC Predictions Based on the Dual-Mechanism Theory of Control 
Several different comparisons to examine the potential relationships among WMC 
and task context with the use of proactive and reactive control. Comparing the high- and 
low-WMC young adults on the AX-CPT-70, the following results are predicted by the 
dual-mechanism theory: 
1. The low-WMC group should produce more errors on AX and BX trials than the 
high-WMC group. 
2. The low-WMC group will not differ from the high-WMC group in either accuracy 
or correct RT for AY trials. 
3. The low-WMC group should produce a greater number of slower responses in the 
slowest part of their RT distribution on AX target trials. 
The manipulation of AX and AY frequency was predicted to have the following 
effects on performance on AX-CPT-10: 
1. The low-WMC group should not produce more errors on BX trials than the high-
WMC group, as the low frequency of targets and X probes will not lead to the 
same prepotency of a target response to the X that is observed in the AX-CPT-70. 
 32
2. The high-WMC group is expected to produce fewer AY errors but more AX 
target errors than in the AX-CPT-70. 
3. The low-WMC group should be slower than the high-WMC group on AY trials 
specifically in the slowest bins of the RT distributions. 
Finally, examining the performance of the high- and low-WMC groups in the 
AX-CPT-40 leads to following predicted results: 
1. The high-WMC group is predicted to be able to use a reactive control mode in 
response to A cues and a proactive control mode in response to B cues. Thus, the 
results should show that AX and AY trials do not differ in accuracy or in correct 
RTs for the high-WMC group, and BX performance should indicate few errors 
and fast correct RTs. 
2. The low-WMC group is predicted to have more difficulty switching between 
proactive and reactive control as necessary. If the WMC groups are equivalent 
when using reactive control, the low-WMC group should show performance on 
AX and AY trials that is qualitatively similar to that of the high-WMC group. 
However, if the high-WMC group is also better able to use reactive control, the 
low-WMC group will show impaired performance even after an A cue. 
3. The low-WMC group should especially have difficulty engaging in proactive 
control when the overall task context favors a reactive control mode, such that BX 





All participants were between 18 and 30 years of age. Out of 120 young adults, 60 
high- and 60 low-WMC individuals were included in the current study based on their 
performance on the automated versions of the Operation and Symmetry Span tasks (see 
description below) from a previous session in the lab. 
All participants were examined for the following exclusionary criteria: (a) 
currently suffering from a major illness that affects the participant’s attention or memory; 
(b) currently taking medication that impairs the participant’s attention or memory; (c) 
history of head injury or trauma; (d) non-English native speaker; and (e) poor visual 
acuity (less than 20/50 corrected). In addition, self-report estimates of current health 
status and years of formal education were also collected. 
Tests to Assess WMC  
Operation Span. In this task, individuals must mentally compute the results of 
mathematical problems while also concurrently remembering to-be-presented letters for 
later recall. Participants first practice the storage portion of the task alone, with individual 
letters presented on the screen for 800 ms, with 1000 ms between each letter. Participants 
are then presented with a response grid of all possible letter stimuli from the memory set 
(12 letters), and the individual must click on the letters in the order they were presented 
on that trial. Participants then practice the processing portion of the task alone, with 
arithmetic problems presented on the screen until the participant makes a mouse click to 
proceed to the answer screen. On the answer screen, the participant must decide whether 
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the number presented onscreen matches the result of the mental calculation that was 
performed by clicking the box for either “True” or “False”. After 15 such practice 
problems, the participants then perform three practice items composed of both the 
processing-and-storage aspects. After completing the practice, the participant completes 
15 experimental processing-and-storage trials. Within each trial, between three and seven 
math problems and letters are presented, with the exact number of items on any given 
trial unknown to the participant. There are three trials of each list length, for a total of 75 
math problems and letters on the task. The main dependent variable for the Operation 
Span is the total number of letters recalled in the correct serial position across all trials. 
Symmetry Span. The task structure is similar to that of the Operation Span just 
described, with the following exceptions. First, instead of remembering letters, 
participants are presented with a 4 x 4 matrix of blank squares, with one square colored in 
red on a given trial. At recall, the participant must indicate the location of the squares 
within the matrix that were colored for that trial. Second, instead of solving math 
problems, participants are presented with an 8 x 8 figure composed of black and white 
squares. The participant must decide whether the figure is symmetrical about its vertical 
axis by clicking “Yes” or “No” on the answer screen. Finally, the list length can vary 
between two and five, for a total of 42 symmetry figures and square locations on the task. 
The main dependent variable for the Symmetry Span is the total number of square 
locations recalled in the correct sequential order across all trials (for more information 
about the validity and reliability of the automated versions of the Operation and 
Symmetry Span, see Barch et al., 2009; Unsworth et al., 2005; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, 
Broadway, & Engle, in press). 
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AX-CPT 
The general materials and stimuli presentation for the three versions of the AX-
CPT utilized are described first, and then the information specific to each version is 
presented separately. Specifically, individual letters were presented one at a time in the 
center of the screen. Capital letters were presented in white on a black background in 24-
point Arial font. All letters except vowels were used as possible cue and probe stimuli. A 
serial response box was used to collect responses. Participants used the index fingers of 
each hand to respond to nontargets and targets, respectively. 
As shown in Figure 1, each trial begins with the presentation of a blank screen for 
1000 ms, followed by a letter (cue) for 500 ms. Next, a blank interstimulus interval of 
4500 ms occurs, followed by another letter (probe) for 500 ms. A beep serves as auditory 
feedback if the participant does not make a response to stimuli within 1000 ms of the 
onset of the letter (miss). A trial sequence with A as a cue and X as a probe defines the 
target, and the participant is instructed to press the target response button as quickly as 
possible when this event happens. All other cue-probe sequences are nontargets; these 
letters are to receive a nontarget response. For each of the different versions of the AX-
CPT described below, Table 4 provides information about the probability of each cue, 
probe, and cue-probe sequence. 
AX-CPT-70. This version of the AX-CPT is most similar to the kind used by 
Barch, Braver, Cohen, and colleagues (for review, see Braver et al., 2002). In this 
version, AX targets occur on 70% of all cue-probe trials. The remaining nontarget trial 
types (AY, BX, BY) all occur on 10% each of cue-probe trials. 
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AX-CPT-10. This version of the AX-CPT is similar to a version used by Dias et 
al. (2003). The main difference between this version of the AX-CPT and the version just 
described is that the frequency of AX targets and AY nontargets is switched. That is, AX 
targets, along with BX and BY nontargets, occur on 10% each of all cue-probe trials, 
whereas AY nontargets occur on 70% of cue-probe trials. 
AX-CPT-40. This version of the AX-CPT has not been reported in the literature 
previously. Again, the main difference between this version of the AX-CPT and the 
versions just described is that the frequencies of AX target and AY nontargets are now 
equal. That is, AX targets and AY nontargets occur on 40% each of all cue-probe trials, 
whereas BX and BY nontargets still occur on 10% each of cue-probe trials. 
Procedure 
Participants were identified as belonging to the high- or low-WMC group 
according to the average of their z-transformed scores on Operation and Symmetry Span. 
If their z-score composite fell within the upper or lower quartiles of scores from our 
database of over 4000 participants, they were assigned to the high- or low-WMC group, 
respectively. Within each WMC group, participants were randomly assigned to the 
various versions of the AX-CPT. Thus, 20 high- and 20 low-WMC individuals were each 
assigned to complete AX-CPT-70, AX-CPT-10, and AX-CPT-40. The different versions 
of the AX-CPT were administered as a between-subjects factor. Trial type frequencies 
were kept constant within an individual in order to prevent possible task order effects that 
would complicate the interpretation of the results (Kane & Engle, 2003; Kane et al., 
2001; Unsworth et al., 2004). 
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Each version of the AX-CPT began with instructions and examples to ensure the 
participant understood the task goals. Each participant performed a practice block of 40 
trials that was constructed to be similar to the experimental blocks that followed. The 
only exception was that each practice trial was followed by auditory accuracy feedback. 
At the end of the practice block, participants must achieve 75% accuracy in order to 
move on to the experimental blocks. All participants in the current studies were able to 
achieve the criterion accuracy level after one practice block. 
Each experimental block contained 40 trials, broken down into the specific target 
and nontarget trial types according to the version of the AX-CPT being performed. 
Because each trial was a fixed duration of 6500 ms, each block lasted 4 minutes, 20 
seconds. Each block was separated by a minimum of 15 seconds, and each block did not 
start until the participant instructed the experimenter to begin. A total of 1 practice block 
and 10 experimental blocks for each version of the AX-CPT, along with time for 
instructions and breaks, took approximately 60 minutes to complete. Participants were 
given the option of taking an extended break halfway through the session.  
Analyses 
For both the probe accuracy and correct mean RT results, an omnibus analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was first conducted with WMC (2) and Version (3) as between-
subjects factors, and Trial Type (4) as the within-subjects factor. Because the predictions 
were tailored to examine the effect of manipulating the cue and target frequencies and 
conditional probabilities as a function of WMC, follow-up split-plot ANOVAs with 
WMC (2) as the between-subjects factor, and Trial Type (4) as the within-subjects factor, 
were conducted separately for AX-CPT-70, AX-CPT-10, and AX-CPT-40. In each case, 
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simple-main-effects independent-samples t-tests (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .0125) 
were conducted to compare performance between the WMC groups on each trial type in 
each task version. Simple-main-effects analyses were also conducted via paired-samples 
t-tests (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .0042) to pairwise compare the different trial types 
within each task version for each WMC group separately. In addition, follow-up analyses 
were conducted for each WMC group separately via split-plot ANOVAs with Version (3) 
as the between-subjects factor, and Trial Type (4) as the within-subjects factor. Tukey’s 
tests (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .0167) were conducted to examine the relative 
performance on the different trial types across each task version for each WMC group 
separately. Given the significant effects of practice observed in the current study (see 
below), the above analyses were also conducted using only the trials from the first five 
blocks (200 trials) of each task. These results are provided in Tables A.1 and A.2 for 
archival purposes and to facilitate comparison with the existing AX-CPT-70 literature. 
Finally, all probe accuracy analyses were additionally conducted using arcsine-
transformed accuracy rates. 
In addition, analyses of the RT distributions were computed for specific trial types 
for each task version: (a) AX trials in the AX-CPT-70; (b) AY trials in the AX-CPT-10; 
and (c) AX and AY trials in the AX-CPT-40. The distribution analyses were conducted 
by first rank-ordering each individual participant’s correct RT for the specific trial type, 
and then dividing each participant’s RT distribution into deciles. Therefore, the fastest 
10% of trials assigned to bin one, the next fastest 10% of trials were assigned to bin two, 
and so on until the slowest 10% of trials were assigned to bin ten. Each individual’s mean 
RT for each bin was then averaged at the group level in order to make comparisons 
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between the high- and low-WMC groups for each task version. A split-plot ANOVA with 
WMC (2) as the between-subjects factor and Bin (10) as the within-subjects factor was 
computed separately for AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-10, and a split-plot ANOVA with 
WMC (2) as the between-subjects factor and Bin (10) and Trial Type (2) as the within-
subjects factors was computed for AX-CPT-40. 
Performance was additionally examined as a function of the amount of practice. 
First, recent studies (Paxton et al., 2006; Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009) have 
shown that older adults’ AX-CPT-70 performance varies relative to the amount of 
practice experienced. Second, the current versions of the AX-CPT presented a total of 
400 cue-probe trials. The main reasons for including a higher number of trials were to 
provide more stable estimates of performance on nontarget trial types and have a 
sufficient number of correct trials to analyze the RT distributions. However, if 
performance changes are observed on specific trial types early vs. late in the task session, 
this could be diagnostic about the processes involved in performance. Practice was 
operationally defined as the first vs. the second half of the task. The first half of the task 
consisted of averaging blocks one through five, and the second half of the task consisted 
of averaging blocks six through ten. An omnibus ANOVA was first conducted with 
WMC (2) and Version (3) as between-subjects factors, and Trial Type (4) and Half (2) as 
the within-subjects factor. To examine the effects of practice separately for each WMC 
group on each task version, performance was then evaluated using repeated-measures 
ANOVAs with Trial Type (4) and Half (2) as the within-subjects factors. Finally, follow-
up paired-samples t-tests (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .0125) were used to statistically 
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evaluate the amount and direction of change in performance indicated by any significant 






Two low-WMC participants were classified as outliers due to extremely low 
accuracy on AX trials, which led to an overall accuracy on probe trials of less than 70%. 
These participants (one in AX-CPT-70, one in AX-CPT-40) were subsequently replaced 
to achieve equivalent sample sizes across WMC group and version of the AX-CPT. The 
demographic information for the final sample is presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Demographic Information for the High- and Low-WMC Participants  
 






High  23.0 (3.1)  0.88 (0.18)  55  85 
 






High  21.8 (2.6)  0.82 (0.14)  45  70 
 






High  23.3 (3.2)  0.92 (0.16)  65  65 
 
Low  23.7 (3.9)  -1.14 (0.56)  60  55 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Probe Accuracy 
The full omnibus ANOVA output is provided in Table B.1. The three-way 
interaction was significant, F(6, 342) = 4.03, p = .001, partial eta2 = .066, and follow-up 
analyses were conducted by examining performance separately for each level of Version 
and subsequently for each level of WMC to decompose this interaction.  
AX-CPT-70 
Accuracy results for probe trials on the AX-CPT-70 are presented in Figure 3a. 
The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 114) = 18.77, p < .001, partial eta2 = 
.331, and although the main effect of WMC was significant, F(1, 38) = 6.14, p < .018, 
partial eta2 = .139, the WMC x Trial Type interaction did not approach significance (F < 
1).  
Comparison between high and low WMC. As can be seen in Figure 3a, the follow-
up independent-samples t-tests on each trial type indicated that the high-WMC 
participants were marginally more accurate than low-WMC participants on AX trials, 
t(38) = 2.53, p = .016, BX trials, t(38) = 2.00, p = .053, and BY trials, t(38) = 2.08, p = 
.044. However, the WMC groups did not differ in accuracy on AY trials (t < 1). Note that 
the WMC group difference on BY trials, although marginally significant, reflects a total  
of 12 errors for the low-WMC group and 4 errors for the high-WMC group out of a total 
of 800 BY trials for each group. 
Comparison within high WMC. For the high-WMC group, probe accuracy results 
were examined via a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 12.91, p < .001, partial 



















































Figure 3. Errors for high- and low-WMC groups on AX-CPT-70 (A), AX-CPT-10 (B), 
and AX-CPT-40 (C). Error bars represent + 1 standard error of the mean.  
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(a) made more errors on AY vs. AX trials, t(19) = 3.75, p = .001; and (b) committed more 
errors on AY vs. BX trials, t(19) = 2.45, p = .024. 
Comparison within low WMC. For the low-WMC group, probe accuracy data 
were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 8.33, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .305. The same follow-up paired-samples t-tests as above confirmed that the low-
WMC group: (a) made more errors on AY vs. AX trials, t(19) = 2.81, p = .011; and (b) 
did not differ in accuracy on AY vs. BX trials (t < 1). 
AX-CPT-10 
Accuracy results for probe trials on the AX-CPT-10 are presented in Figure 3b. 
The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 114) = 91.06, p < .001, partial eta2 = 
.706, as was the main effect of WMC, F(1, 38) = 13.39, p = .001, partial eta2 = .261. 
However, these effects were qualified by a significant WMC x Trial Type interaction, 
F(3, 114) = 15.04, p < .001, partial eta2 = .284. 
Comparison between high and low WMC. As is evident from Figure 3b, follow-up 
independent-samples t-tests indicated that high-WMC individuals were significantly 
more accurate than low-WMC individuals on AX trials, t(38) = 3.93, p < .001. However, 
the WMC groups did not differ in accuracy on all other trial types (all t’s < 1). 
Comparison within high WMC. For the high-WMC group, probe accuracy results 
were examined via a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 32.73, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .633. Theoretically relevant paired-samples t-tests indicated the high-WMC group: 
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(a) made more errors on AX vs. AY trials, t(19) = 6.00, p < .001; and (b) committed more 
errors on AX vs. BX trials, t(19) = 5.22, p < .001. 
Comparison within low WMC. For the low-WMC group, probe accuracy data 
were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 59.72, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .759. The same follow-up paired-samples t-tests as above confirmed that the low-
WMC group: (a) made more errors on AX vs. AY trials, t(19) = 7.92, p < .001; and (b) 
committed more errors on AX vs. BX trials t(19) = 7.37, p < .001. 
AX-CPT-40 
Accuracy results for probe trials on the AX-CPT-40 are presented in Figure 3c. 
Significant main effects of Trial Type, F(3, 114) = 28.17, p < .001, partial eta2 = .426, 
and WMC, F(1, 38) = 7.94, p = .008, partial eta2 = .173, were qualified by a significant 
WMC x Trial Type interaction, F(3, 114) = 7.13, p < .001, partial eta2 = .158. 
Comparison between high and low WMC. As shown in Figure 3c, follow-up 
independent-samples t-tests indicated that the high-WMC group was significantly more 
accurate than the low-WMC group on AX trials, t(38) = 2.91, p = .006, and BX trials 
(marginally), t(38) = 2.04, p = .048. However, the two WMC groups did not differ in 
accuracy on AY trials, t(38) = 1.35, p = .184, nor on BY trials (t < 1). 
Comparison within high WMC. For the high-WMC group, probe accuracy results 
were examined via a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 13.05, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .407. Theoretically relevant paired-samples t-tests indicated the high-WMC group: 
(a) made more errors on AX vs. AY trials, t(19) = 3.76, p = .001; (b) did not differ in 
 46
accuracy on AX vs. BX trials (t < 1); and (c) produced more errors on BX vs. AY trials, 
t(19) = 2.62, p = .017. 
Comparison within low WMC. For the low-WMC group, probe accuracy data 
were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 18.53, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .494. The same follow-up paired-samples t-tests as above confirmed that the low-
WMC group: (a) made more errors on AX vs. AY trials, t(19) = 4.43, p < .001; (b) 
committed more errors on AX vs. BX trials, t(19) = 2.32, p = .031; and (c) produced 
more errors on BX vs. AY trials, t(19) = 5.60, p < .001. 
Comparison across Versions 
High WMC. Accuracy for the high-WMC group was examined as a function of 
Version and Trial Type. Although the main effect of Version was not significant, F(2, 57) 
= 1.86, p = .165, the main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 171) = 19.98, p < 
.001, partial eta2 = .260. Critically, the Version x Trial Type interaction was significant, 
F(6, 171) = 18.69, p < .001, partial eta2 = .396. 
Tukey’s tests were used to examine the effects of Version upon each trial type. 
For AX trials, AX-CPT-10 accuracy was significantly lower than both AX-CPT-40 and 
AX-CPT-70 (both p’s < .001), which did not differ from each other (p = .231). For AY 
trials, AX-CPT-10 accuracy was significantly higher than both AX-CPT-40 and AX-
CPT-70 (both p’s < .001), which did not differ from each other (p = .653). For BX trials, 
accuracy on the three task versions was not significantly different from each other (all p’s 
> .183). Finally, on BY trials, accuracy on the three task versions was not significantly 
different from each other (all p’s > .736). 
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Low WMC. Accuracy for the low-WMC group was analyzed as a function of 
Version and Trial Type. Although the main effect of Version was not significant, F(2, 57) 
= 1.12, p = .332, the main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 171) = 38.40, p < 
.001, partial eta2 = .402. Again, the Version x Trial Type interaction was significant, F(6, 
171) = 21.77, p < .001, partial eta2 = .433. 
Tukey’s tests were conducted to examine the effects of Version upon each trial 
type. For AX trials, AX-CPT-10 accuracy was significantly lower than both AX-CPT-40 
(p = .002) and AX-CPT-70 (p < .001), and the difference between AX-CPT-40 and AX-
CPT-70 approached significance (p = .052). For AY trials, AX-CPT-10 accuracy was 
significantly higher than both AX-CPT-40 and AX-CPT-70 (both p’s < .001), which did 
not differ from each other (p = .905). For BX trials, AX-CPT-10 accuracy was 
significantly higher than AX-CPT-70 (p = .002) and marginally higher than AX-CPT-40 
(p = .048), and there was no difference between AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-40 (p = .514). 
Finally, for BY trials, AX-CPT-70 accuracy was marginally lower than AX-CPT-10 (p = 
.019), but the other comparisons were not significant (both p’s > .134). 
Probe Accuracy Summary 
The analyses of the accuracy results produced several significant effects involving 
WMC. The analyses indicated that the low-WMC group made more: (a) AX errors on 
AX-CPT-70, AX-CPT-10, and AX-CPT-40; and (b) BX errors on AX-CPT-70 and AX-
CPT-40. That is, across the various versions of the task, the significant WMC differences 
in accuracy occurred when the probe decision involved the letter X. In all task versions, 
correctly responding to the probe letter X depends upon remembering the most recent cue 
letter (A or B), whereas the correct response to any other probe letters (Y) can be made 
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without regard to the specific cue that preceded the probe letter. The implications of these 
results are explored further in the Discussion.  
Probe Mean RT 
The full omnibus ANOVA output is provided in Table B.2. The three-way 
interaction was not significant (F < 1). However, the Trial Type x Version interaction 
was significant, F(6, 342) = 53.76, p < .001, partial eta2 = .485, and the WMC x Trial 
Type interaction was marginally significant, F(3, 342) = 2.57, p = .05, partial eta2 = .022. 
Follow-up analyses were conducted by examining performance separately for each level 
of Version and subsequently for each level of WMC to decompose these interactions. 
AX-CPT-70 
Mean RT results for probe trials on the AX-CPT-70 are presented in Figure 4a. 
Although the main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 114) = 125.31, p < .001, 
partial eta2 = .767, both effects involving WMC were not significant: WMC, F(1, 38) = 
2.41, p = .129; WMC x Trial Type, F(3, 114) = 1.47, p = .226.  
Comparison between high and low WMC. The follow-up independent-samples t-
tests on each trial type indicated that the high-WMC participants were marginally faster 
than low-WMC participants on BY trials, t(38) = 2.00, p = .053. However, the WMC 
groups did not differ in mean RT on AX trials, t(38) = 1.51, p = .140, AY trials, t(38) = 
1.15, p = .256, or BX trials, t(38) = 1.09, p = .283. 
Comparison within high WMC. For the high-WMC group, probe mean RT results 
were examined via a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 92.28, p < .001, partial 

















































Figure 4. Correct mean RT for high- and low-WMC groups on AX-CPT-70 (A), AX-
CPT-10 (B), and AX-CPT-40 (C). Error bars represent + 1 standard error of the mean.  
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(a) was slower on AY vs. AX trials, t(19) = 16.70, p < .001; and (b) took longer to 
respond on AY vs. BX trials, t(19) = 9.27, p < .001. 
Comparison within low WMC. For the low-WMC group, probe mean RT data 
were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 44.32, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .700. The same follow-up paired-samples t-tests as above confirmed that the low-
WMC group: (a) was slower on AY vs. AX trials, t(19) = 12.38, p < .001; and (b) took 
longer to respond on AY vs. BX trials t(19) = 6.46, p < .001. 
AX-CPT-10 
Mean RT results for probe trials on the AX-CPT-10 are presented in Figure 4b. 
Although the main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 114) = 69.75, p < .001, 
partial eta2 = .647, both the main effect of WMC (F < 1) and the WMC x Trial Type 
interaction, F(3, 114) = 1.15, p = .331, were not significant. 
Comparison between high and low WMC. The follow-up independent-samples t-
tests on each trial type indicated that the high and low-WMC participants did not 
significantly differ in mean RT to any of the trial types: AY trials, t(38) = -1.16, p = .253 
(all other t’s < 1). 
Comparison within high WMC. For the high-WMC group, probe mean RT results 
were examined via a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 24.47, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .563. Theoretically relevant paired-samples t-tests indicated the high-WMC group: 
(a) was slower on AX vs. AY trials, t(19) = 4.30, p < .001; and (b) took longer to respond 
on AX vs. BX trials, t(19) = 3.14, p = .005. 
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Comparison within low WMC. For the low-WMC group, probe mean RT data 
were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 51.94, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .732. The same follow-up paired-samples t-tests as above confirmed that the low-
WMC group: (a) was slower on AX vs. AY trials, t(19) = 9.57, p < .001; and (b) took 
longer to respond on AX vs. BX trials t(19) = 4.79, p < .001. 
AX-CPT-40 
Mean RT results for probe trials on the AX-CPT-40 are presented in Figure 4c. 
Although the main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 114) = 26.47, p < .001, 
partial eta2 = .411, both effects involving WMC were not significant: WMC, F(1, 38) = 
1.56, p = .219; WMC x Trial Type, F(3, 114) = 1.80, p = .151. 
Comparison between high and low WMC. The follow-up independent-samples t-
tests on each trial type indicated that the high-WMC participants were marginally faster 
than low-WMC participants on BY trials, t(38) = 1.94, p = .060. However, the WMC 
groups did not differ in mean RT on any other trial types: BX trials, t(38) = 1.27, p = .211 
(all other t’s < 1). 
Comparison within high WMC. For the high-WMC group, probe mean RT results 
were examined via a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 15.93, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .456. Theoretically relevant paired-samples t-tests indicated the high-WMC group: 
(a) was slower on AY vs. AX trials, t(19) = 6.35, p < .001; (b) did not differ in the time to 
respond on AX vs. BX trials (t < 1); and (c) took longer to respond on AY vs. BX trials, 
t(19) = 2.60, p = .018. 
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Comparison within low WMC. For the low-WMC group, probe mean RT data 
were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as the within-subjects 
factor. The main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 57) = 11.49, p < .001, partial 
eta2 = .377. The same follow-up paired-samples t-tests as above confirmed that the low-
WMC group: (a) was slower on AY vs. AX trials, t(19) = 3.75, p = .001; (b) did not 
differ in the time to respond on AX vs. BX trials, t(19) = 1.25, p = .227; and (c) did not 
differ in mean RT to BX vs. AY trials (t < 1). 
Comparison across Versions 
High WMC. Probe mean RT for the high-WMC group was examined as a function 
of Version and Trial Type. Although the main effect of Version was not significant, F(2, 
57) = 1.53, p = .226, the main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 171) = 67.71, p < 
.001, partial eta2 = .543. Critically, the Version x Trial Type interaction was significant, 
F(6, 171) = 22.84, p < .001, partial eta2 = .445. 
Tukey’s tests were used to examine the effects of Version upon each trial type. 
For AX trials, AX-CPT-10 mean RT was significantly slower than both AX-CPT-70 (p < 
.001) and AX-CPT-40 (p = .005), and AX-CPT-40 mean RT was significantly slower 
than AX-CPT-70 (p = .015). For AY trials, AX-CPT-10 mean RT was significantly faster 
than AX-CPT-70 (p = .002), but no other differences were significant (both p’s > .136). 
For BX trials, AX-CPT-70 mean RT was marginally faster than AX-CPT-10 (p = .069), 
but no other differences were significant (both p’s > .328). Finally, on BY trials, mean 
RT on the three task versions was not significantly different from each other (all p’s > 
.393). 
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Low WMC. Probe mean RT for the low-WMC group was examined as a function 
of Version and Trial Type. Although the main effect of Version was not significant (F < 
1), the main effect of Trial Type was significant, F(3, 171) = 43.43, p < .001, partial eta2 
= .432. Critically, the Version x Trial Type interaction was significant, F(6, 171) = 32.49, 
p < .001, partial eta2 = .533. 
Tukey’s tests were used to examine the effects of Version upon each trial type. 
For AX trials, AX-CPT-10 mean RT was significantly slower than AX-CPT-70 (p < 
.001) and marginally slower AX-CPT-70 (p = .036), which did not significantly differ 
from each other (p = .105). For AY trials, AX-CPT-10 mean RT was significantly faster 
than both AX-CPT-40 (p = .001) and AX-CPT-10 (p < .001), which were significantly 
different from each other (p = .006). For both BX and BY trials, mean RT on the three 
task versions was not significantly different from each other (all p’s > .240 and .169, 
respectively). 
Probe Mean RT Summary 
The analyses conducted on the mean RTs can be summarized rather succinctly, at 
least in regard to differences between the two WMC groups. In AX-CPT-70 and AX-
CPT-40, the high-WMC group was marginally faster than the low-WMC group on BY 
trials. Otherwise, the WMC groups did not differ in the speed with which they responded 
to the probe trials across the various trial types. These results are examined further in the 
Discussion.  
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RT Distribution Analyses 
AX-CPT-70 
AX trials in the AX-CPT-70 were used to form RT distributions for the high- and 
low-WMC groups, which are shown in Figure 5a. The main effect of Bin was significant, 
F(9, 342) = 457.48, p < .001, partial eta2 = .923. Although the main effect of WMC was 
not significant, F(1, 38) = 2.26, p = .141, the WMC x Bin interaction was significant, 
F(9, 342) = 2.41, p = .012, partial eta2 = .060.  
AX-CPT-10 
AY trials in the AX-CPT-10 were used to form RT distributions for the high- and 
low-WMC groups, which are shown in Figure 5b. The main effect of Bin was significant, 
F(9, 342) = 618.48, p < .001, partial eta2 = .942, but neither the main effect of WMC, 
F(1, 38) = 1.35, p = .253, nor the WMC x Bin interaction (F < 1) was significant. 
AX-CPT-40 
AX and AY trials in the AX-CPT-40 were used to form RT distributions for the 
high- and low-WMC groups, which are shown in Figure 5c. Significant main effects of 
Bin, F(9, 342) = 552.20, p < .001, partial eta2 = .936, and Trial Type, F(1, 38) = 47.37, p 
< .001, partial eta2 = .555, were obtained, along with a significant Bin x Trial Type 
interaction, F(9, 342) = 27.15, p < .001, partial eta2 = .417. However, neither the main 
effect of WMC (F < 1), nor any of the interactions with WMC were significant: WMC x 
Bin (F < 1); WMC x Trial Type, F(1, 38) = 1.28, p = .265; WMC x Bin x Trial Type, 
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Figure 5. RT distributions for high- and low-WMC groups on AX-CPT-70 (A), AX-CPT-
10 (B), and AX-CPT-40 (C). Error bars represent + 1 standard error of the mean.  
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For AX trials, the main effect of Bin was significant, F(9, 342) = 442.60, p < 
.001, partial eta2 = .921, but neither the main effect of WMC nor the WMC x Bin 
interaction was significant (both F’s < 1). For AY trials, the main effect of Bin was 
significant, F(9, 342) = 523.74, p < .001, partial eta2 = .932, but neither the main effect of 
WMC nor the WMC x Bin interaction was significant (both F’s < 1). 
RT Distribution Summary 
The analyses of the RT distributions produced mixed results across the three task 
versions. The only significant difference obtained between the WMC groups was on AX-
CPT-70, where there was a significant WMC x Bin interaction. The source of the 
interaction can be seen in Figure 5a: the RTs for the fastest bin are 269 ms and 281 ms 
for the high- and low-WMC groups, respectively; in comparison, the RTs for the slowest 
bin are 583 ms and 639 ms for the high- and low-WMC groups, respectively. However, 
for both the AX-CPT-10 and AX-CPT-40, the WMC x Bin interaction did not approach 
significance. 
Practice Analyses of Accuracy 
The full results of the omnibus ANOVA are provided in Table B.3. Examining 
the higher-order interactions involving the factor Half, the four-way interaction was 
marginally significant, F(6, 342) = 2.06, p = .057, partial eta2 = .035, as was the three-
way interaction of WMC x Trial Type x Half, F(3, 342) = 2.50, p = .060, partial eta2 = 
.021. In addition, the three-way interaction of Version x Trial Type x Half was 
significant, F(6, 342) = 2.85, p = .010, partial eta2 = .048, although the WMC x Version x 
Half interaction was not significant (F < 1). 
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AX-CPT-70 
The probe accuracy results as a function of the first half vs. the second half of 
trials in the task session are presented in Figure 6. Looking first at the high-WMC group 
in Figure 6a, both the main effect of Half and the Trial Type x Half interaction were not 
significant (both F’s < 1). Focusing on the low-WMC group in Figure 6b reveals a 
different pattern of results. Although the main effect of Half was not significant (F < 1), 
the Trial Type x Half interaction was significant F(3, 57) = 5.98, p = .001, partial eta2 = 
.239. Paired-samples t-tests indicated the low-WMC group committed marginally more 
AY errors (p = .018) and fewer BX errors (p = .079) during the second half of the AX-
CPT-70. 
AX-CPT-10 
The probe accuracy results as a function of the first half vs. the second half of 
trials in the task session are presented in Figure 7. Concentrating first on the high-WMC 
group in Figure 7a, the main effect of Half was marginally significant, F(1, 19) = 3.77, p 
= .067, partial eta2 = .166. This main effect was qualified by a significant Trial Type x 
Half interaction, F(3, 57) = 5.93, p = .001, partial eta2 = .238. Paired-samples t-tests 
indicated the high-WMC group committed marginally more AX errors (p = .019) during 
the second half of the AX-CPT-10. Inspecting the performance of the low-WMC group in 
Figure 7b, both the main effect of Half and the Trial Type x Half interaction were not 
significant (both F’s < 1). 
AX-CPT-40 
The probe accuracy results as a function of the first half vs. the second half of 
trials in the task session are presented in Figure 8. Examining the performance of the 
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high-WMC group in Figure 8a, both the main effect of Half (F < 1) and the Trial Type x 
Half interaction, F(3, 57) = 1.05, p = .377, were not significant. However, analyzing the 
performance of the low-WMC group in Figure 8b revealed that although the main effect 
of Half was not significant (F < 1), the Trial Type x Half interaction was significant, F(3, 
57) = 4.06, p = .011. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that the low-WMC group made 
marginally more AX errors (p = .054) during the second half of the AX-CPT-40. 
Practice Accuracy Summary 
Somewhat surprisingly, including more blocks of trials in order to have more 
observations for statistical analyses of the rarely occurring nontarget trials had the 
unintended consequence of producing specific practice effects. On AX-CPT-70, only the 
low-WMC group showed an effect of practice, by making more AY errors and fewer BX 
errors later in the task session. On AX-CPT-10, only the high-WMC group showed an 
effect of practice, by making more AX errors later in the task session. Finally, on AX-
CPT-40, only the low-WMC group showed a practice effect, by making marginally more 
AX errors later in the task session. The changes in performance observed on specific trial 




















































Figure 6. Errors for high-WMC (A) and low-WMC (B) groups as a function of practice 












































Figure 7. Errors for high-WMC (A) and low-WMC (B) groups as a function of practice 












































Figure 8. Errors for high-WMC (A) and low-WMC (B) groups as a function of practice 





Across three versions of the AX-CPT, the WMC level of the participant 
influenced accuracy specifically on AX and BX trials. As mentioned previously, these are 
the only trial types where responding correctly to the probe stimulus depends upon the 
preceding cue stimulus. In contrast, the probe Y on AY and BY trials provided full 
information as to the correct nontarget response. The implication of this finding is that 
what differentiates the two WMC groups is the ability to use memory of local cue stimuli 
to guide behavior according to global task instructions and goals. 
AX Performance as an Index of Cue Maintenance 
The low-WMC participants made more AX errors than the high-WMC 
participants across all three task versions. AX errors reflect making an incorrect nontarget 
response to the probe letter X. Note that if the prepotency of the target response to the 
letter X was the sole determinant of BX errors, increased AX errors by the low-WMC 
group would not be expected. In fact, because the probe X almost always follows the cue 
A in AX-CPT-70, AX errors should reflect not actively maintaining the cue and instead 
an incorrect retrieval of the cue upon presentation of the probe X. Correct AX trials 
should reflect a mixture of sometimes using the cue to prepare a target response in 
advance, other times correctly retrieving the cue upon presentation of the probe, and the 
influence of guessing based on the high probability of making a target response to an X 
(Table 4). Thus, correct AX trials should be faster than AX errors on AX-CPT-70. This 
was the case for both the high-WMC group (p < .001) and the low-WMC group (p = 
.001). Note that if instead the AX errors were the result of encoding the cue letter 
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incorrectly, then the prediction would be that AX errors would be faster than correct AX 
trials – the participant would have been able to prepare a nontarget response, and thus the 
RTs would be expected to be similar to the RTs obtained on correct BX trials. 
This interpretation is additionally strengthened by the analyses of the RT 
distributions of correct AX trials. Again, assume that the fastest AX trials represent 
response preparation during the cue-probe interval, whereas the slowest AX trials are 
more likely situations where the cue was not actively maintained or translated into 
preparing a target response. On the fastest AX trials, the RT difference between the two 
WMC groups was 12 ms, whereas on the slowest AX trials, the RT difference was 56 ms. 
Although the WMC groups did not differ in mean RT on AX trials, the WMC interaction 
observed with regard to the RT distributions indicates that the low-WMC group engaged 
in more trials where they had to retrieve the cue representation from secondary memory. 
This explanation would also apply to the increased AX errors produced by the low-WMC 
participants – not only does this search process take a varying amount of time, but it also 
can result in retrieving the incorrect cue representation. Again, the implication is that 
these errors occurred as a consequence of not maintaining the cue information, and 
resulted from the imperfect search process. 
On AX-CPT-40, the low-WMC group produced more AX errors than the high-
WMC group. This occurred despite the fact that the A cue in this task version was 
equally predictive of the subsequent probe requiring a target or a nontarget response. 
Thus, although maintaining access to the cue representation is necessary for success on 
AX trials, selectively preparing either response in advance would not be beneficial for 
performance in the long run. However, if one was using the A cue to prepare a nontarget 
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response, or simply preparing a nontarget response given the response frequencies listed 
in Table 7, then these AX errors should be faster than correct AX trials. In fact, AX errors 
were slower than correct AX trials for both the high-WMC group (p = .004) and the low-
WMC group (p = .011). 
Table 7 
Target and Nontarget Response Probabilities across the Versions of the AX-CPT 
 
   All Stimuli    Probe Stimuli Only 
 
Version p(target) p(nontarget)   p(target) p(nontarget) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
AX-CPT-70 .35  .65    .70   .30 
 
AX-CPT-10 .05  .95    .10   .90 
 
AX-CPT-40 .20  .80    .45   .55 
 
On AX-CPT-10, the low-WMC participants produced over twice as many AX 
errors as the high-WMC participants. At first glance, the high number of AX errors 
should reflect the influence of preparing a nontarget response based on the knowledge 
that the A cue in this task version is strongly predictive of a Y probe letter. However, the 
high number of AX errors on AX-CPT-10 could also indicate the fact that a nontarget 
response was made to 95% of all stimuli, and to 90% of all probe stimuli (Table 7). In the 
Introduction, I outlined that the AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-10 task versions were the 
same, with the exception that the A cue could be used in a proactive manner to prepare a 
target response in AX-CPT-70 and to prepare a nontarget response in AX-CPT-10. 
However, this oversimplification ignores the effect that this manipulation had upon the 
different response probabilities (Table 7). That is, although the cue-probe conditional 
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probabilities were manipulated, so too were the frequencies of making either a target or 
nontarget response. 
If one is using the cue to prepare a response in the cue-probe interval, as the high-
WMC individuals appear to be doing, then they would be primarily affected by the cue 
validity manipulation. Thus, their performance on BX and BY conditions in AX-CPT-70 
and AX-CPT-10 are very similar, and performance on the AX and AY conditions are 
essentially reversed across the two task versions. This pattern does not hold for the low-
WMC group. If instead, the low-WMC group is less likely to use the cue to prepare a 
response in advance, and they can respond correctly on 95% of all stimuli by making a 
nontarget response, this would seem to reinforce not maintaining the cue. Individuals 
using this way of responding would perform quickly and accurately on AY, BX, and BY 
trials in the AX-CPT-10, and would only show impaired performance on the very rare 
AX trials. 
The explanation I have given here is somewhat analogous to the explanation 
provided by Kane and Engle (2003) to account for the Stroop performance of high- and 
low-WMC individuals across various proportion congruency manipulations, which was 
briefly mentioned in the Introduction. In their Experiment 1, Kane and Engle manipulated 
the frequencies of the various trial types so that the proportion of congruent trials was 
high (75%) relative to the proportion of incongruent trials (25%). In this condition, the 
word and color information provided the same correct information on the majority of 
trials. Thus, although the task instructions were to ignore the word information and 
respond based upon the color information, simply responding by reading the word would 
lead to quick and accurate performance on most trials. However, responding in this 
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manner would lead to inaccurate performance on the rare incongruent trials, as reading 
the word on these trials would be an error. They found that the low-WMC group 
committed nearly double the number of incongruent errors as the high-WMC group. In 
addition, the low-WMC group produced a larger facilitation effect on congruent relative 
to neutral trials, another indication they were more often reading the word than the high-
WMC group was. 
The Stroop results are relevant because, as mentioned in the Introduction, Braver 
and Hoyer (2008) have argued that the mostly-congruent version of the Stroop task 
induces a reactive control mode. Braver and colleagues would likely argue that the AX-
CPT-10 also promotes a reactive mode. Note that this interpretation is slightly different 
than the way that I have used the term ‘reactive’ – perhaps the proper label would be 
‘not-proactive’. Conceptualizing the AX-CPT-10 as having a global context that 
promotes not maintaining the cue can help the WMC effects on this task fit within the 
proactive and reactive control framework. The high-WMC individuals are performing 
consistent with the notion they are maintaining the cue and using it to prepare a response 
in advance of the probe based on the predictive utility of the cue. In contrast, the low-
WMC individuals are still not maintaining the cue, and are instead automatically making 
a nontarget response, given that this response is correct on virtually all trials. 
BX Performance as an Index of Cue Maintenance 
In addition, the low-WMC individuals made more BX errors than the high-WMC 
individuals on both the AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-40, but not on the AX-CPT-10. 
Importantly, BX trials are particularly indicative of whether or not an individual is 
maintaining the cue and/or using the cue to prepare a response in advance of the probe. 
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As outlined in Table 4, the B cue is perfectly predictive of a nontarget response to be 
made to the subsequent probe stimulus. Using this information in advance of the probe 
stimulus is important on BX trials, where the letter X appears as the probe. Across all 
task versions, the letter X is associated both with making a target and a nontarget 
response. Thus, there is response uncertainty associated with the letter X, and it is only in 
conjunction with the cue that there is absolute information to respond correctly. However, 
across task versions, the amount of response uncertainty varies, which helps explain the 
specific pattern of BX errors for the high- and low-WMC participants. 
On AX-CPT-70, BX errors could be a consequence of either: (a) an inability to 
maintain or retrieve the representation for the preceding cue; or (b) difficulty in 
preventing a target response, given that the probability of making a target response to 
probe stimuli was p = .70 (Table 7). Thus, the worse BX performance by the low-WMC 
group on this task version is insufficient to confirm that they are less likely to maintain or 
remember the cue. However, as mentioned previously, the low-WMC participants also 
made more AX errors on AX-CPT-70, which goes against the idea that the BX errors 
simply reflect an inhibitory impairment. In addition, the low-WMC individuals also made 
more BX errors than the high-WMC individuals on AX-CPT-40. BX errors on this task 
version should be specifically due to not maintaining or remembering the cue, because 
both the overall response frequency and the probe response frequency favored a nontarget 
response (Table 7). 
Why, then, do the high- and low-WMC groups not differ in BX accuracy on AX-
CPT-10? If BX errors indicate a failure of maintaining the cue information, one might 
expect the two WMC groups to differ here as well. The answer appears to again be 
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related to the response frequencies associated with the various stimuli (Table 7). On AX-
CPT-10, a target response is to be produced to only 5% of all stimuli and 10% of all 
probe stimuli. Thus, the response that is likely to be executed by default would be a 
nontarget response, even if the B cue information has not been used to specifically 
prepare a nontarget response in advance. 
Further Evidence Supporting the Proactive vs. Reactive Control Framework 
Looking solely at the results of AX-CPT-70, one could make an argument that the 
high-WMC group is engaged in proactive control, and the low-WMC group is engaged in 
reactive control. In this regard, the results are consistent with the idea that the high-WMC 
group is more often preparing to respond in advance of the presentation of the probe, 
whereas the low-WMC group is instead often waiting until the presentation of the probe 
letter to initiate the response selection process. 
On AX-CPT-70, the low-WMC participants made more BX errors than the high-
WMC group, indicative that they did not maintain the information that the B cue 
perfectly predicted that the subsequent letter would require a nontarget response. In 
addition, whereas the high-WMC group made significantly more AY errors than BX 
errors, the low-WMC group produced a similar number of errors across the two trial 
types. Finally, the low-WMC group’s increased AX errors can be interpreted as a failure 
to maintain the A cue until the X probe appeared. 
In addition, the accuracy results of the high-WMC group across all three task 
versions are largely consistent with the idea that these individuals are engaging in control 
according to the predictive information conveyed by the cue. In AX-CPT-70, the high-
WMC group made the most errors on AY trials, consistent with the idea that they used 
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the A cue to expect an X as the subsequent probe, and thus prepared a target response 
during the cue-probe interval. In AX-CPT-10, the pattern reversed, with the high-WMC 
group producing the most errors on AX trials. In this version, the A cue was strongly 
predictive of a subsequent Y as the probe. Thus, the high-WMC participants appeared to 
prepare a nontarget response during the cue-probe interval, and the proportion of AX 
errors committed in the AX-CPT-10 was strikingly similar to the proportion of AY errors 
committed in the AX-CPT-70. Finally, in AX-CPT-40, the high-WMC group made a 
similar amount of errors on AX and AY trials. Although the number of AX errors was 
statistically greater than the number of AY errors, the difference between the two trial 
types was much smaller compared to AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-10. Because the A cue 
was equally predictive of a subsequent target or nontarget response, differentially 
preparing one response during the cue-probe interval would be largely counterproductive. 
This manipulation was introduced to induce a reactive mode in high-WMC individuals, 
and compared to the performance on AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-10, appears consistent 
with this interpretation.  
Evidence against the Proactive vs. Reactive Control Framework? 
Despite the results discussed so far, there are data that can be taken as inconsistent 
with the idea that the high-WMC group is solely influenced by the cue information to 
guide behavior. First, the difference between AX and AY accuracy on AX-CPT-40 
mentioned above was significant – in terms of the predictive utility of the A cue, the 
performance on the two trial types should be identical. In addition, within each task 
version, the high-WMC participants made more errors on BX trials compared to BY 
trials. In each version, the B cue always signaled that the subsequent probe letter would 
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require a nontarget response regardless of the probe letter’s identity. Thus, participants 
strictly using the cue to guide behavior would be expected to prepare a nontarget 
response during the cue-probe interval, and performance on the two trial types should be 
equivalent. Note that these two points are rather minor, and assume the extreme case that 
only the cue is used to guide responding – if this was actually the case, the high-WMC 
group would make zero errors on AX trials in AX-CPT-70 and AY trials in AX-CPT-10, 
and make errors on all AY trials in AX-CPT-70 and all AX trials in AX-CPT-10. 
By and large, the results on the AX-CPT-70 and the AX-CPT-10 can be 
interpreted as supporting the proposal that the high-WMC groups primarily used 
proactive control and the low-WMC groups primarily used reactive control (remember 
that the low-WMC group’s AX-CPT-10 performance is better understood as ‘not-
proactive’). However, the AX-CPT-40 provides an interesting test of this explanation. 
Because the A cue is equally predictive of a nontarget and target response, the reactive 
mode should be favored on these trial types (AX and AY). However, the B cue remains 
perfectly predictive of a nontarget response, and so the proactive mode should be favored 
on these trial types (BX and BY). To some extent, the AX-CPT-40 corresponds to the 
mostly-neutral condition in Braver and Hoyer (2008), which was argued to “lead to a 
mixture of reactive and proactive control modes” (p. 7). Thus, the results in this task 
version should provide evidence as to whether the high- and low-WMC groups can 
switch between the two control modes as necessary for successful task performance. 
On the AX-CPT-40, the low-WMC group made more AX and BX errors than the 
high-WMC group. As a group, the high-WMC participants made slightly over two times 
more AX errors than AY errors, whereas the low-WMC participants made over nine 
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times more AX errors than AY errors. In addition, the high-WMC group made a similar 
proportion of errors on AX and BX trials, whereas the low-WMC group made 
significantly more AX errors than BX errors. 
The substantial increase in AX errors for the low-WMC group compared to the 
high-WMC group is particularly diagnostic with regard to the strict dichotomous 
hypothesis that high-WMC individuals use proactive control, and low-WMC individuals 
use reactive control instead. This is because the A cue in AX-CPT-40 was designed to be 
equally predictive of a target and a nontarget response. There is no specific response to 
prepare in advance of the probe stimulus, and so both high- and low-WMC participants 
should wait until the probe stimulus appears to begin selecting the appropriate response. 
Note that even when the two WMC groups are assumed to be behaving similarly during 
the cue-probe interval (i.e., not preparing a response in advance), the low-WMC group 
still produces many more AX errors than the high-WMC group. This suggests that not 
only are high-WMC individuals more likely to use proactive control to prepare a 
response based on cue validity when available (AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-10), they are 
also more likely to effectively use reactive control to select the appropriate response 
associated with the cue and probe combination.  
Practice Effects on AX-CPT 
Recent AX-CPT-70 research (Paxton et al., 2006; Braver et al., 2009) identified 
interesting practice effects upon older adults’ AX-CPT performance. In the current 
research, practice effects on accuracy were also observed. In fact, the four-way WMC x 
Version x Trial Type x Half interaction was marginally significant (p = .057), and there 
were significant Trial Type x Half interactions on AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-40 for the 
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low-WMC group, and on AX-CPT-10 for the high-WMC group. Interestingly, the AX-
CPT-70 practice effects for the low-WMC group were similar to those obtained by 
Paxton et al. for older adults. The low-WMC participants made fewer BX errors later in 
the task session, but committed more AY errors in the second part of the session (Figure 
6b). This pattern has been labeled the “training-related proactive shift” (Braver et al., 
2009, p. 7352). The low-WMC group’s specific pattern of performance change in AX-
CPT-70 is consistent with the notion that the participants shifted to using the cue to 
prepare the appropriate responses during the cue-probe interval during the second half of 
the task. That is, the decrease in BX errors suggests using the B cue to prepare the 
unambiguous nontarget response, and the increase in AY errors suggests using the A cue 
to prepare the likely target response. Note that the pattern is inconsistent with an 
alternative explanation that the low-WMC group simply did not understand the task 
instructions at the beginning of the task, as the level of AX and BY errors did not change 
throughout the task. 
Looking at AX-CPT-10, the high-WMC group showed the only effect of practice 
(Figure 7a). The high-WMC participants produced more AX errors in the second half of 
the task. Although it is not entirely clear why the high-WMC group would commit an 
increased amount of AX errors with more task experience, the results are still consistent 
with the idea that they are actively using the A cue to prepare the expected nontarget 
response. On AX-CPT-40, the low-WMC group showed a marginal increase in AX errors 
on the second half of the task (Figure 8b). As mentioned previously, the A cue in this task 
version was equally predictive of an upcoming target and nontarget response. Thus, if the 
effect of practice is to cause the low-WMC group to shift to using more of a proactive 
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control mode, they are using the A cue to prepare a nontarget response more often than a 
target response. 
As can be seen in the work of Paxton et al. (2006), the effects do not seem related 
to any specific training strategy, as the three different training groups produced the same 
performance changes in their study. In addition, Braver et al. (2009) observed a 
relationship between the accuracy changes and fMRI activity modulation in bilateral 
PFC, providing further evidence that the processes involved in performance of AX-CPT-
70 differ not only between-subjects (e.g., young vs. older adults), but also within-
subjects. Further research is clearly needed in this area to understand more definitively 
why these practice effects are observed. In addition, specific interventions might be 
implemented before the task session to improve the identified group’s performance. 
Lack of WMC Effects Involving Mean RT  
Somewhat surprising was the lack of significant between-WMC-group differences 
in mean RT across the versions of the AX-CPT, except for marginal effects on BY trials. 
Previous research on AX-CPT-70 found that high-WMC individuals were faster than 
low-WMC individuals on AX, BX, and BY trials (Redick & Engle, 2008). The previous 
study used more participants in each WMC group, and although the differences in the 
current study were not significant, they were in the same direction. In addition, the 
pattern within each WMC group was similar across studies, with both groups slowest on 
AY trials. An additional difference was that in Redick and Engle (2008), target and 
nontarget responses were made with the index and middle fingers of the same hand, 
whereas in the current research, the two responses were mapped to the index fingers of 
the left and right hands. Consistent with previous research showing that two-choice RTs 
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are faster when mapped to separate hands versus separate fingers on the same hand (e.g., 
Kornblum, 1965), the overall mean RT was faster in the current work. Finally, there was 
a significant interaction involving WMC when analyzing the RT distributions for AX 
trials in AX-CPT-70. Although there were too few trials in the previous study to conduct 
analyses on the RT distributions, the low-WMC group in that study was found to be more 
variable in their AX responses as indicated by a higher individual standard deviation, 
consistent with the current results of the RT distribution analyses. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Despite the significant effects found across the various versions of the AX-CPT 
for the WMC groups, future research can help provide further information about the 
nature of individual differences in WMC and the relationship with proactive and reactive 
control. One issue is that the identification of behavior as manifesting proactive or 
reactive control remains a largely inductive process. Although Braver et al. (2009) and 
Paxton et al. (2008) have used fMRI activation dynamics to segregate specific regions as 
showing cue-related vs. probe-related activity, these analyses are still conducted at a level 
of aggregation that prevents identifying on a trial-by-trial (or moment-by-moment) basis 
the type of control mode in use. Thus, future research should integrate recent 
development in the neuroimaging and electrophysiological literatures (e.g., Debener et 
al., 2005) to provide more accurate estimates for the likelihood of engaging in proactive 
or reactive control.  
Different techniques focusing on the behavioral performance can also shed light 
on the dual-mechanisms account, and manipulations involved in affecting the likelihood 
of using proactive versus reactive control. Braver et al. (2007) proposed that proactive 
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control would be more likely to be used in situations emphasizing speeded responses over 
accurate performance, and Locke and Braver (2008) provided evidence for this idea by 
rewarding faster performance and punishing errors in separate blocks of AX-CPT-70. 
However, examination of speed-accuracy functions via manipulations of response 
deadlines may provide more detailed information about the proactive/reactive control 
framework. In the current study, the manipulation of AX and AY frequency occurred 
between-subjects, given previous WMC research showing order effects of proportion 
congruency in the Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 2003) and trial type in the antisaccade task 
(Kane et al., 2001). However, manipulation of the AX and AY trial types within 
participants allows the application of binary mixture distribution analyses (DeJong, 2000) 
to provide further evidence that task variables affect individuals in a manner that is 
theoretically consistent with either cue-based or probe-based responding. 
Braver and colleagues have also manipulated other aspects of the AX-CPT, 
including using different durations of the cue-probe interval and presenting irrelevant 
distractor letters during the cue-probe interval. These manipulations may provide further 
information about the high- and low-WMC individuals’ ability to use the cue information 
to guide responding. Although a previous AX-CPT study did not find an interaction of 
WMC with the duration of the interval (Redick & Engle, 2008), other research using a 
cued-visual search task found that the length of the cue-target interval was influenced by 
the participant’s corresponding level of WMC (Poole & Kane, in press). 
An additional factor that should manipulate the mode of control that is optimal for 
task performance is the type of response format. Instead of the target/nontarget choice 
response format used in the current research and in most recent studies by Braver, Barch 
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and colleagues, the target-detection only method of responding may be useful in teasing 
apart proactive versus reactive control in the AX-CPT. The concept of comparing choice 
response formats against go/no-go response formats is not new; Donders (1868/1969) 
argued that response selection time could be measured by subtracting the latter from the 
former. The original version of the AX-CPT used by Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, and 
Steingard (1997) and Cohen, Barch, Carter, and Servan-Schreiber (1999) was more 
consistent with the continuous performance literature, where participants only make 
responses to a specific target and not a choice response to every stimulus. Although this 
difference in response format has been largely overlooked within the AX-CPT literature, 
Braver, Barch, and Cohen (1999) in a technical report noted that this response change did 
produce some differences in AX-CPT results observed within young adults. Namely, 
Braver et al. (1999) found that AY trials were more error-prone than BX trials in young 
adults using the target/nontarget version; this pattern can be observed in Table 3 as well. 
In contrast, studies using the target-only response method have found more BX errors 
than AY errors (Cohen et al., 1999; Javitt et al., 2000; Javitt, Rabinowicz, Silipo, & Dias, 
2007; Lee & Park, 2006; but see Perlstein et al., 2003; Stratta, Daneluzzo, Bustini, 
Prosperini, & Rossi, 2000). This is an important discrepancy to clarify, as the pattern of 
AY and BX errors is a critical part of the proactive versus reactive control classification.  
Implications for Theories of WMC  
There are several prominent theories of WMC other than the models of Engle and 
colleagues that have been discussed throughout. Although it was not the goal of the 
current study to explicitly compare these alternative theories with the dual-mechanism 
theory endorsed here, the results are largely inconsistent with some of the main accounts. 
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A first alternative explanation is that the low-WMC individuals are simply less-motivated 
participants, and so their impaired performance reflects less effort instead of an ability 
difference. Recent research has provided evidence against the motivation hypothesis 
(Heitz, Schrock, Payne, & Engle, 2008), and the current research is inconsistent with this 
idea. The low-WMC participants made more errors than the high-WMC participants only 
on theoretically-relevant conditions. For example, on AX-CPT-10, the low-WMC group 
made more AX errors, but achieved the same level of accuracy and RT performance as 
the high-WMC group on the other 90% of the trials. In addition, both WMC groups 
exhibited faster RTs later in the task session as compared to earlier, inconsistent with an 
idea that the low-WMC group was specifically less motivated. Finally, the practice 
effects on accuracy discussed previously also indicate specific changes in performance, 
and not a general lack of effort by the low-WMC group. 
In addition, the paucity of significant mean RT results between the two WMC 
groups contradicts a general speed account of WMC differences (Salthouse & Babcock, 
1991). That is, if the low-WMC individuals are simply slower processors of information, 
they would be expected to produce slower RTs. However, this was not the case, even 
though the mean RTs were over 500 ms in some conditions. Although one may argue via 
inspection of Figure 4 that the trend toward slower RTs for the low-WMC group is 
apparent on AX-CPT-70 and AX-CPT-40, the results numerically indicate that the low-
WMC group produced faster RTs on AX-CPT-10. 
An inhibition account of individual differences in WMC (Lustig, Hasher, & May, 
2001) can partially account for the error differences observed across the versions of the 
AX-CPT administered here, for some of the reasons already mentioned about the 
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prepotency of certain responses with specific stimuli. Given that that probe X is 
associated with making a target response on AX-CPT-70 (and perhaps on AX-CPT-40), 
the data indicating more errors produced by the low-WMC participants is consistent with 
an inhibitory deficit. However, this account has difficulty explaining why the low-WMC 
group produces more AX errors in the same two task versions. If the A biases toward a 
target response, and the X biased toward a target response, why would the low-WMC 
participants not execute the biased or automatic response? Instead, interpreting the results 
as differences in the use of proactive and reactive control is more consistent with the 
overall pattern of results. 
 What, then, do the current results imply for the theories of Engle and colleagues? 
As mentioned, the proactive/reactive framework maps onto both the two-factor theory of 
executive control (Engle & Kane, 2004) and the primary/secondary memory theory 
(Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Within the terminology of the dual-mechanism theory 
(Braver et al., 2007), proactive control maps onto goal maintenance and primary-memory 
capacity, whereas reactive control corresponds to response-conflict resolution and 
secondary-memory retrieval. The current research serves to more concretely specify ideas 
about goal maintenance and response prepotency in relation to individual differences in 
WMC. Manipulating cue-probe contingencies across the versions of the AX-CPT 
administered in the current studies permits examination of performance as a function of 
both the global and local context, as opposed to inferences about local performance that 
are presumed to occur due to global context manipulations (e.g., proportion congruency 
effects). In addition, there is more experimental control over the goal-related information 
from trial- to-trial: the information conveyed by the most recent cue as opposed to a 
general instruction to “name the ink color”. The need to constantly update and maintain 
information temporarily in order to serve task goals seems more consistent with notions 
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of the function that a working memory module should perform within the information-




 The current research investigated individual differences in WMC within the dual-
mechanism theory of control (Braver et al., 2007). The results indicate that high-WMC 
individuals are more likely to use information conveyed by a cue to prepare a response in 
advance, but only when the cue information is predictive of subsequent action. When the 
cue was uninformative as to the subsequent probe, the high-WMC individuals were still 
better at accessing the cue information in order to select the correct response after the 
probe was presented. Overall, individuals high in WMC behave in a manner consistent 
with proactive control when possible, whereas individuals low in WMC are more likely 




Errors on the First Half of Each AX-CPT for the High- and Low-WMC Groups 
 






High   3.1 (3.1) 14.3 (13.1) 7.3 (9.5) 0.8 (1.8) 
 






High   13.0 (11.3) 0.8 (0.9) 3.0 (5.0) 0.3 (1.1) 
 






High   6.3 (4.8) 3.3 (3.0) 6.5 (7.3) 0.0 (0.0) 
 
Low   16.2 (13.2) 2.4 (1.7) 13.0 (11.2) 0.5 (1.5) 




Mean RT on the First Half of Each AX-CPT for the High- and Low-WMC Groups 
 






High   388 (56) 536 (51) 414 (113) 374 (71) 
 






High   521 (104) 464 (101) 496 (138) 411 (115) 
 






High   449 (51) 498 (59) 455 (106) 395 (70) 
 
Low   464 (66) 502 (60) 505 (105) 438 (68) 





Complete Omnibus ANOVA Output for Error Data 
 
Effects and interactions     F  partial ?2  p 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 




 WMC      26.24  .187  < .01 
 Version     2.37  .040     .10 
 Trial Type     55.75  .328  < .01 
 
2-way interactions 
 WMC x Version    0.28  .005     .75 
 WMC x Trial Type    11.73  .093  < .01 
 Version x Trial Type    37.95  .400  < .01 
 
3-way interaction 
 WMC x Version x Trial Type  4.03  .066  < .01 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 




 WMC      16.69  .128  < .01 
 Version     3.65  .060     .03 
 Trial Type     135.57  .543  < .01 
 
2-way interactions 
 WMC x Version    0.11  .000     .99 
 WMC x Trial Type    10.52  .085  < .01 
 Version x Trial Type    48.17  .458  < .01 
 
3-way interaction 







Complete Omnibus ANOVA Output for Mean RT Data 
 




 WMC      1.47  .013     .23 
 Version     0.70  .012     .50 
 Trial Type     110.14  .491  < .01 
 
2-way interactions 
 WMC x Version    1.33  .023     .27 
 WMC x Trial Type    2.57  .022     .05 
 Version x Trial Type    53.76  .485  < .01 
 
3-way interaction 





Complete Omnibus ANOVA Output for Practice Analyses of Error Data 
 




 WMC      26.24  .187  < .01 
 Version     2.37  .040     .10 
 Trial Type     55.75  .328  < .01 
 Half      1.78  .015     .19 
 
2-way interactions 
 WMC x Version    0.28  .005     .75 
 WMC x Trial Type    11.73  .093  < .01 
 WMC x Half     0.74  .006     .39 
Version x Trial Type    37.95  .400  < .01 
 Version x Half    0.33  .006     .72 
 Trial Type x Half    7.82  .064  < .01 
  
3-way interactions 
 WMC x Version x Trial Type  4.03  .066  < .01 
 WMC x Version x Half   0.68  .012     .51 
 WMC x Trial Type x Half   2.50  .021     .06 
 Version x Trial Type x Half   2.85  .048     .01 
 
4-way interaction 
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